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ABSTRACT
OPERATING MEASURES, IPO VALUATION, AND AFTER MARKET 
PERFORMANCE- PERSPECTIVE FROM INTERNET BUBBLE PERIOD
Yuhong Fan 
Old Dominion University, 2005 
Director: Dr. Mohammed Najand
Internet related firms experienced an extremely high degree of underpricing in the 
year 1999 and 2000; 40 percent more than underpricing of Non-Internet firms. Two 
explanations for this phenomenon are examined: the changing-risk composition 
hypothesis and overreaction hypothesis. Empirical tests are conducted in three stages: 
first trading day, short-term, and long-term performances. The results are consistent with 
both hypotheses, and the high initial returns for Internet firms are explainable by 
investors’ overreaction and the firm’s high uncertainties.
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11. Introduction
Internet related initial public offerings (IPOs) have begun to catch researchers’ 
interests in the past few years, especially after the tumultuous years between 1999 and 
2000, in which a large amount of Internet firms went public. These IPOs experienced 
extremely high initial returns; 88.6% for Internet firms and 44.7% for non-Internet firms. 
There are some articles that studied Internet IPOs, (such as Bartov (2002), Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2001), Schultz and Zaman (2001), Cooper Dimitrov, and Rau (2001), and 
Jaggia and Thosar (2004)), but few of them try to explain the phenomenon of Internet 
firms earning super high initial returns in the same period that non-Internet firms earned 
much less initial returns. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to propose an explanation for 
this specific phenomenon. Two hypotheses are proposed and examined: the changing-risk 
composition hypothesis and the overreaction hypothesis.
The changing risk composition hypothesis (Ritter, 1984), which is based on the 
asymmetric information theory, states that the degree of underpricing is correlated with 
firm’s ex ante uncertainty. The more uncertain the market is about the true value of the 
issuing firm, the higher the discount the company must offer to uninformed investors to 
submit their bids. Therefore, underpricing activity should be increased with the ex ante 
uncertainty surrounding an issue. The overreaction hypothesis is derived from behavior 
theory, and states that investors often violate rational choices when making decisions. 
According to DHS (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998), initial overreaction 
and self-attribution bias would drive the price above the rational expected value. Further 
information will gradually induce the price back toward the fundamental value. Based on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2the changing risk composition hypothesis and overreaction hypothesis, the high initial 
returns for Internet firms could be due to their high future uncertainty, investor’s 
overreaction, or both.
The Pioneer work on Internet IPOs is Bartov et al (2002), in which the authors 
show how Internet-related firms were initially priced with a small sample of 98 Internet 
firms. The contribution of their article is to investigate whether there exists valuation 
differences between Internet and Non-Internet firms in the initial prospectus price, final 
offer price, and first trading day price. Unlike the standard IPO research, their work 
focused on studying offer prices instead of initial returns. Unlike Bartov (2002), who 
studied the association between pricing of Internet IPOs and a set of financial variables, 
this article uses pre-IPO performance variables as an uncertainty proxy to explain the 
higher initial returns for Internet firms based on the changing risk composition hypothesis. 
Thus the argument in this article is that Internet-related firms face higher future 
uncertainty than non-Internet firms, and lead to higher initial returns compared to non- 
Internet related firms. Moreover, this study not only focuses on the initial return period, 
but also investigates IPOs’ short run and long run aftermarket performances. The 
combination of investing firms’ performances in the initial day, 6 month, and 36 month 
after initial offerings gives a broader and unique view of valuing Internet stocks than 
Bartov and other researcher’ work.
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2001) report that ownership structure and inside selling 
behavior can partially explain the astronomical initial return for 1999-2000. They find 
that insider ownership stakes have declined from 1996 to 2000, and 1999 and 2000 
witnessed a sharp decline in both the frequency and magnitude of secondary sales of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3existing shares by pre-IPO owners. The authors argued that these changes in ownership 
structure and selling behavior should undermine the incentives to bargain over the offer 
price, thus contribute to the high initial returns for 1999 and 2000. However, in their 
article, the question as to why in the same period (1999 and 2000) Internet-related firms 
earned over 40% more initial return than non-Intemet related firms is still unanswered. 
Unlike Ljungqvist and Wilhelm’s study (2001), which is focused on the principal-agent 
perspective, this article is based on asymmetric information and behavior theory. 
Actually, this paper finds that Internet firms exhibit lower float ratio (measured as share 
offered divided by total shares outstanding) than non-Intemet firms, from which it can be 
inferred that insider ownership is higher for Internet firms than for non-Intemet firms, 
thus the insider ownership can not explain high initial returns for internet firms.
Jaggia and Thosar (2004) find evidence to support DHS’ overreaction framework 
by investigating high-tech IPOs medium-term aftermarket performance. The authors 
proposed an overreaction explanation for IPOs based on the overreaction framework. 
When given a favorable signal, investors’ overconfidence pushes the stock price above its 
rational expected level at time 1. If investors observe that public signals are consistent 
with their initial assessment, self-attribution bias will drive the price even higher, and 
further away from the rational level at time 2. The arrival of later public information 
gradually induces the price back to the fundamental value at time 3. According to this 
overreaction framework, Jaggia and Thosar (2004) propose that overreacted IPOs will 
exhibit positive momentum in the short run. However, Jaggia and Thosar (2004) only 
test the DHS overreaction hypothesis in the short run (6 months after IPO) in a sample of 
301 high-tech IPOs, and find that momentum variables are important to explain firm’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4short run performance, which is consistent with an overreaction prediction. Unlike Jaggia 
and Thosar’s (2004) work, this article tests the overreaction hypothesis in initial return 
period, short run (6-month), and long run (36-month) aftermarket performances using 
broader pre-IPO operating performances as proxies for firms’ fundamentals. The sample 
includes not only Internet firms, but also Non-Intemet firms with the aim of showing the 
divergent patterns of Internet and non-Intemet firms in the initial return and after offering 
periods.
Based on the proposed changing risk composition and overreaction hypothesis, 
empirical tests are conducted in these three stages: first trading day, short-term, and long 
nrn performances. If the changing risk composition hypothesis is appropriate to explain 
high initial return for Internet firms, Internet firms should face higher future uncertainties 
than non-Intemet firms, and proxies for uncertainty variables could explain firms’ initial 
returns. If overreaction behavior for Internet firms exists in the pre-offering and initial 
trading day, one would observe that Internet firms exhibit high initial return, which 
cannot be explained by their fundamentals. Moreover, according to DHL’s theory, one 
would expect that Internet firms exhibit a short-run positive price momentum and the 
long-run price reversal pattern. Thus the logic behind investigating IPO’s long-run 
performance in this article is to test the proposed overreaction explanation of the 
extremely high initial underpricing of Internet firms in the Internet bubble period. The 
most common explanation of IPO’s initial underpricing is based on the asymmetric 
information theory, such as the risk composition hypothesis. However, few articles really 
test the overreaction hypothesis, even though researchers like to mention that the long- 
run underperformance could be due to investors’ initial overreaction. It is also believed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5that Internet IPOs can be employed as a good means of testing investors’ overreaction, 
since Cooper et al. (2003) preliminarily find that investors react positively to firms 
changing their names to “dot com.”
Variables like years existing before IPO, offer size, pre-IPO operating 
performances, and sales growth rate are chosen as the proxies to measure firms’ ex-ante 
uncertainty. The results are consistent with the changing risk composition hypothesis. 
Among all the uncertainty measures, sales growth rate and age of the firm before IPO are 
the most powerful variables to explain initial returns. Sales growth rate is positively 
related to initial return, whereas age before IPO is negatively related. Debt per share, debt 
to assets, and size are significant predictors for initial returns, however the direction of 
these relationships are not as hypothesized.
Preliminary results from this study are also consistent with the overreaction 
hypothesis in several respects. First, it is demonstrated that as an industrial class, Internet 
firms have a tendency to experience upward price revision when compared to non- 
Intemet firms. 274 out of 376 Internet firms and 184 out of 368 non-Intemet firms 
experienced upward price revision, while 69 Internet firms and 125 Non-Intemet firms 
experienced downward price revision. Based on book building theory, price revision 
should be higher for offers where there is a strong demand. Moreover, A firm’s price 
revision can be explained by an Internet dummy variable that is highly significant (0.01 
level) with a coefficient more than 0.14. Second, the Internet dummy variable is 
significantly and positively related to initial returns after controlling for uncertainties, 
with coefficient of more than 0.30. OLS regression with initial return as the dependent 
variable shows that pre-IPO performances are not significant predictors of firms’ initial
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and age before IPO for non-Intemet firms. Third, Internet firms had a clear pattern of 
positive price momentum and long-run price reversal compared to non-Intemet firms. 
The 6 and 36-month buy and hold returns are 17.34% and -53.68% for Internet firms and 
5.41% and -1.56% for non-Internet firms. The regression results show that Internet firms 
earned 24% higher 6-month buy and hold returns than non-Intemet firms when 
controlling firm’s risk and initial returns. Fundamental variables like sales per share and 
sales to total assets before IPO, which cannot explain initial returns and short-term 
returns, can explain firms’ long-run buy and hold returns with significantly positive 
coefficients. Internet firms earned significantly negative three year buy-and-hold index 
adjusted returns after controlling for change of operating performances, size, and market- 
to-book ratio.
Regarding underwriter’s self-selection, the results show that prestigious 
underwriters tend to select larger offer size and better pre-IPO performing firms. Sales 
per share and offer size are significant criteria of underwriters’ self-selection. For 
prestigious underwriters, non-Intemet firms chosen have better pre-IPO performance than 
Internet firms that were chosen. Overall, the results do not support the hypothesis that 
prestigious underwriters do not consider Internet firms’ performance when undertaking 
them.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a review of the 
literature; section 3 describes the sampling method and data resources; section 4 reports 
the analysis of the determinant of price revision and underpricing; section 5 studies the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7sample firms’ long-run market performance, and section 6 shows the evidence of 
underwriter’s self selection.
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82. Literature Review
2.0 Why do firms go public?
Before studying the IPO market, it is helpful to answer a fundamental question: 
why do firms go public? It is commonly understood that firms go public to raise equity 
capital and to create a public market in which the founders and other shareholders can 
convert their wealth into cash at some future date. Life cycle theories and market-timing 
theories have been developed to explain the rationale of firm management to go public.
According to the Life Cycle theory, a firm will be privately owned at first, but if it 
grows sufficiently large, there will be an impetus to go public (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
1999). Public trading has costs and benefits. In addition to the initial underpricing, going 
public implies considerable direct costs: underwriting fees, registration fees etc. Then 
there are recurring expenses such as fees on auditing, certification, and dissemination of 
accounting information. Since many of these expenses do not increase proportionally 
with the size of IPO, they weigh relatively more heavily on small companies. Ritter 
(1987) has estimated that in the United States, the fixed costs equal approximately 
$250,000 and the variable costs are about 7 percent of the gross proceeds of the IPO. 
From the view of transaction costs, it is suggested that the likelihood of an IPO should be 
positively correlated with company size. Moreover, Public trading can definitely add 
value to firms, as it may inspire more faith in the firm from other investors, customers, 
creditors, and suppliers. In addition, public trading may also confer a first-mover 
advantage if the firm is the first in its industry to go public (Ritter and Welch 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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which allows access to financial resources other than banks or venture capital. This is 
probably the most cited benefit of going public. According to Pagano et al (1998), the 
opportunity to tap public market for funds should be particularly appealing for companies 
with large current and future investments, high leverage, and high growth. Besides this, if 
the initial owners want to raise money from dispersed investors, listing on an organized 
exchange provides better liquidity than an informal search for buyers. Pagano et al (1998) 
found evidence from firms in Italy that the likelihood of an IPO increases with the size of 
the company.
It is well known that firms postpone their equity issues if they know they are 
currently undervalued and have an incentive to go public if they recognize that other 
companies in their industry are overvalued. To the extent that a bear market places too 
low a value on the firm, IPOs will be delayed until a bull market offers a more favorable 
pricing. In Pagano’s (1998) paper, the authors measure the buoyancy of the relevant 
market by the median market-to book ratio of public companies in the same industry, and 
empirically they found that the likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the industry’s market 
to book ratio.
Ritter and Welch (2002) propose that there would be more IPOs after a period of 
high initial returns because underwriters encourage more firms to go public when public 
valuations turn out to be higher than expected, and because underwriters discourage firms 
from filing when the public valuations turn out to be lower than expected. Lowry and 
Schwert (2002) find that both IPO volumes and average initial returns are highly 
autocorrelated. Their data show a strong pattern of negative correlations between current
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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initial returns and past numbers of IPOs along with strong positive correlations between 
current initial returns and future numbers of IPOs. It is suggested that companies time 
their IPOs in response to the size of recent initial returns.
Schultz and Zaman (2001) found unfavorable evidence for the market-timing 
theory. The authors try to find evidence regarding why 321 Internet firms rush to go 
public during Januany 1999 through March 2000 with an average first day return of 91%. 
Interestingly, most these companies had little if any revenue, and only 28 of the 321 were 
profitable in the previous quarter. Two explanations are investigated in this article; the 
first is that managers hurry to take their companies public because the market is 
irrationally overpriced. The second argues that the prices of these stocks are reasonable 
given the tremendous growth and enormous potential of the Internet. Based on the 
second explanation, companies rush to grab market share in an industry in which 
economies of scale ensure that only a few firms will survive in each niche. The results of 
the Schultz and Zaman (2001) study show that there is only weak evidence to support the 
argument that Internet IPOs are attempts to sell overpriced stocks.
2.1 Theories and evidence on IPO’s underpricing
The IPO market has attracted so much attention because companies on average 
underprice their shares when going public (Ritter 1984, Loughran and Ritter 1995). This 
implies on the one hand that investors make profits if they purchase stocks at offer price 
(when they are underpriced), and on the other hand, issuing firms substantially lose 
potential proceeds due to a lower offer price. Several theories have developed to explain
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the phenomenon of IPO’s underpricing. They are Asymmetric information -  the winner’s 
curse, overreaction, underpricing as a signal of firm’s quality, book-building theory, 
change issue objective function, avoid litigation, and the marketing roles of IPO.
2.1.1 Asymmetric Information: the winner’s curse
The best-known asymmetric information model of initial underpricing is Rock’s 
(1986) “winner’s curse.” Rock assumes that both the issuing firms and its underwriting 
bank are completely uninformed about the true value of the shares offered. However, 
some investors (not all) are perfectly informed (referred to as “informed investors”). 
Informed investors bid only for attractively priced IPOs, whereas the uninformed 
investors bid indiscriminately. This imposes a “winner’s curse” on uninformed investors: 
in unattractive offerings, they receive all the shares they bid for which informed investors 
would not bid; in attractive shares, they face competition for shares from informed 
investors. For uninformed investors, the average profits from underpriced shares would 
offset the losses from overpriced shares. In extreme cases, uninformed investors may 
receive 100 percent overpriced offerings and no shares of underpriced offerings, which 
results in negative returns. If uninformed investors expect this result, they may withdraw 
from the market and only the informed investors stay. Rock assumes that the primary 
market is dependent upon the continued participation of uninformed investors, which 
means informed demand is insufficient to account for all the shares offered even in 
attractive offerings. Since the market needs the participation of uninformed investors, 
deliberate underpricing offerings is undertaken to help the uninformed investors to break 
even. This does not remove the allocation bias against the uninformed. They will still be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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crowded out by informed investors in most under-priced offerings, but they will no 
longer absorb losses on average.
Ritter (1984) further developed and tested the implications of Rock’s model, 
namely by suggesting a positive relationship between the degree of underpricing and ex 
ante uncertainty. He argues that the more uncertain the market is about the true value of 
the issue firm, the higher the discount the company must offer to the uninformed 
investors to submit the bids. If high-risk offerings represent an unusually large fraction of 
initial public offerings in some periods, these periods should have unusually high average 
initial returns and is called hot issue market. Two variables are used as proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty; 1) the annual sales of the issuing firm prior to the official listing, and 2) the 
volatility of its first 20-day stock returns after initial listed measured as the standard 
deviation of returns. Even though this study shows a positive relationship between the 
degree of risk and underpricing, there are still very high initial returns for nature resource 
companies during the hot issuing market after controlling for their risks. Thus, he 
concludes that the changing risk composition cannot explain the unusually high average 
initial returns during the hot issue period.
Researchers have also extended the study of IPO underpricing to specific 
industries such as the close-end funds and REITs. For example, Weiss (1990) and Peavy 
(1991) report that new issues of close-end funds average a zero return on their first day of 
trading and are associated with a 10% negative abnormal return in the subsequent 100 
trading days. This lack of initial underpricing is consistent with the winner’s curse 
explanation of underpricing because there is little uncertainty about the value of a close- 
end fund. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) find evidence that equity REIT IPOs in the 1990s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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have been under-priced on average by 3.6%, and have moderately outperformed seasoned 
equity REITs in the 100 trading days after issuance. REIT IPO underpricing is attributed 
to greater valuation uncertainty and a higher degree of institutional involvement. Initial 
returns are negatively related to the underwriter’s reputation -  a commonly 
acknowledged proxy for uncertainty - and positively related to the initial level of 
institutional share ownership. Evidence from this study is consistent with the winner’s 
curse hypothesis of underpricing.
2.1.2 Overreaction
Test of overreaction can only be achieved by combining the underpricing of an 
IPO and its long run under-performance. According to this behavioral explanation, there 
are fads in the IPO market, with investors initially being over-optimistic about the 
prospects of newly listed companies and bidding up initial trading prices beyond fair 
value. In the long-run, the firm’s performance should reflect it’s fundamental values, 
which leads to the negative long-run abnormal returns. Ritter (1991) finds that the issue 
firms during 1975- 84 substantially underperformed a sample of matching firms from 
first trading day till their 3-year anniversaries. He concludes that investors are 
periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth companies. 
Mikkelson et al (1997) show that long-run share price performance is related to a change 
in operating performance. When operating performance fails to sustain pre-offering level, 
shares price fall.
2.1.3 Underpricing as a signal of firm’s quality
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Unlike the winner’s curse, which assumes some investors have better information 
about the issue firm, theory of underpricing as a signal assumes companies have better 
information about the present value and the risk of their future cash flows than do 
investors. Based on this asymmetric information, underpricing may become a means of 
convincing potential buys of the high value of the firm. Several studies tested the 
signaling theory concerning the relation between initial underpricing and later equity 
offering. Issue firms deliberately under-price their IPOs to signal the true value and to 
achieve a better price for a subsequent equity offering. If firms do underprice to signal 
investors favorably for later equity offerings, one would expecte reissuing companies to 
have experienced great underpricing. However, evidence on this is mixed. For example, 
Welch (1989) and Jegadeesh et al (1993) test the signaling hypotheses empirically by 
assessing the likelihood of a Seasoned equity offering as a function of the IPO 
underpricing. They find a small impact of underpricing for the likelihood of SEOs. 
Clearly, signaling models would be of little practical importance if companies did not 
follow a multiple-stage sale policy of an initial offering followed by subsequent equity 
offerings or inside sales.
2.1.4 Book Building Theory
Book Building is a method for underwriters to decide the final offer price 
according to the expressed demand by investors. Book Building consists of three main 
steps. The first step is that the investment bank determines which investors will be 
invited to participate. In most cases, small retail investors are not included in book 
building efforts. In the second stage, invited investors are required to submit indications
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of demand. At the final stage of book building, the final price and share allocation are 
determined according to submitted demand and shares supply. If there is a strong demand, 
the underwriter will set a higher offer price. But if potential investors know that showing 
a willingness to pay a high price will result in higher offer price, these investors must be 
offered something in return. To induce investors to reveal true intent regarding share 
purchases at a high price, underwriters must offer them some combination of more IPO 
allocations and underpricing opportunities when they indicate a willingness to purchase 
shares at a high price. Hanley (1993) empirically tested the bookbuilding theory, and 
found that when underwriters revise the share price upward from their original estimation 
in the preliminary prospectus, underpricing tends to be greater.
2.1.5 Changing issuer objective function
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that the changing issuer objective function can 
explain the increase in underpricing during the bubble period. The changing issuer 
objective function asserts that, holding constant the level of managerial ownership and 
other characteristics, issuing firms become more willing to leave money on the table. 
Issuers have put less weight on IPO proceeds and more weight on the proceeds from 
future sales and side payments.
The authors proposed two explanations; the first is the analyst coverage 
hypothesis, the second is the corruption hypothesis for the willingness of underpricing. 
The analyst coverage hypothesis is related to the increased importance of analyst 
coverage. As issuers placed more emphasis on hiring a lead underwriter with a highly 
ranked analyst to cover the firm, they became less concerned about avoiding underwriters
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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with a reputation for excessive underpricing. According to the corruption hypothesis, co­
operating decision-makers receive side payments. Beginning in the 1990s, underwriters 
began to allocate hot IPOs to personal accounts, and to the venture capitalist and the 
executives of issuing firms. This activity may encourage issue firms to choose a lead 
underwriter with a reputation for severe underpricing rather than avoid choosing it.
2.1.6 Legal liability hypothesis
The basic idea of legal liability hypothesis is that companies knowingly sell their 
stock at a discount to insure against future lawsuits from shareholders disappointed with 
the performance of their shares. Shareholders can sue the issuers on the grounds that 
material facts were misstated or omitted from an IPO prospectus. Tinic (1988) argue that 
intentional underpricing may act as insurance against such securities litigation. He 
assume that the more overpriced an issue, the more likely is a future lawsuit.
2.1.7 The marketing role of IPOs
Demers and Lewellen (2003) explore the potential marketing benefits of going 
public and of IPO underpricing. They use web traffic as a direct measurement of product 
market performance for Internet firms. Underpricing is expected to be a marketing tool; 
specifically, it is seen as a way to attract media attention and create valuable publicity. 
These authors find that post-IPO growth in web traffic is positively associated with initial 
returns. In order to investigate whether there are marketing benefits associated with 
going public that extend beyond the hot market for consumer-oriented Internet IPOs, they 
extend their analysis to a larger sample of Internet companies and to a random sample of
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non-Intemet IPOs. For both samples, the post-IPO marketing benefits, which are 
measured as media exposure, are positively associated with initial returns.
2.2 Evidence of IPO’s long-run Underperformance
Another area that attracts the interest of academics in recent years is the post-IPO 
long-run performance. Efficient market proponents would argue that once an IPO is 
issued, the stock is just like other stock and thus the aftermarket stock price should 
appropriately reflect its fundamental value. Therefore, risk adjusted post-IPO stock price 
performance should not be predictable.
The pioneering work in this field is Ritter (1991). In his study, the author finds 
that issuing firms during 1975-84 substantially underperformed a sample of matching 
firms from the closing price on the first day of public trading to their three-year- 
anniversaries. The average holding period return for the sample IPOs is 34.47%, whereas 
a control sample matched by industry and market value produced an average total return 
of 61.86% over the same 3 year holding period. The worst performing companies were 
young companies and those going public in heavy volume years. Three explanations are 
proposed: bad luck, risk mis-measurement, and over-optimism. The evidence presented 
is consistent with the notion that many firms go public near the peak of industry-specific 
fads.
Tech, Welch, and Wong (1998) attribute some of the poor post-IPO performance 
to “optimistic” accounting early in the life of the firm. It is not surprising that firms are 
eager to look good when they conduct their IPOs, and that the investors has difficulties in
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finding hidden warning signals. According to these authors, the cause of poor long run 
market performance is due to earning management as earnings reported in excess of cash 
flows by taking positive accruals are tested. They provide evidence that issuers with 
unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the 
three-year after. IPO issuers in the most aggressive categorization of earning 
management experienced a 20 percent three-year after market return lower than issues in 
the most modest earning management categorization. This suggests that at least a part of 
the poor long-run performance is due to a market that is optimistic and unable to see 
tough times ahead.
Yi (2001) investigates pre-offering earnings and long-run performance of IPOs. 
This study finds that IPO firms as a whole underperformed a market index and control 
firms over a 3-year period after initial issue, which is consistent with Ritter (1991)’s 
result. Moreover, firms with positive pre-offering earnings perform better than firms 
with negative earnings. Among all the firms, only the firms going public with negative 
earnings have a statistically significant negative abnormal mean return. Yi (2001) is also 
consistent with the over-optimistic hypothesis, that investors may have been too 
optimistic about future prospects of IPO firms, especially those with negative earnings.
In Jain and Kini’s (1994) study, a significant decline in operating performance 
subsequent to the IPO is found. Operating performance included operating return on asset, 
operating cash flow to total assets, sales, and asset turnover. The authors conclude that 
the decline in post-issue operating performance is inconsistent with the fact that IPO 
firms are initially priced at high price-earning multiples. IPO firms that start with high 
market to book ratio and price to earning ratios experience a decline in these measures
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after IPO. Overall, the evidence suggests that investors appear to value firms going 
public based on the expectation that earnings growth will continue, when in actuality, 
they are not even sustained. Ritter (2002) conducted a review of relevant literature, in 
which he mentioned that there is no reliable relationship between short-run underpricing 
and long-run performance. These results are sensitive to whether penny stock IPOs are 
included.
2.3 Evidence on underwriter’s reputation
Literature on the relationship between an underwriter’s reputation and the IPO’s 
underpricing is interesting. Beatty and Welch (1996), Loughran and Ritter (2002), and 
others have documented that a negative relationship between underwriter prestige and 
underpricing existed in the 1980s, but reversed in the 1990s. In the 1980s, prestigious 
underwriters were associated with less underpricing, and investors did not demand a large 
underpricing because of the great reputation capital that is committed. However, the 
greater underpricing associated with prestigious underwriters in the 1990s and Internet 
bubble period is inconsistent with the hypothesis that underwriters attempt to maximize 
issue proceeds and that reputation is an important determinant of the money on the table. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002)’s results show that over time, especially in the Internet 
bubble period, prestigious underwriters relaxed their underwriting standards and took 
public an increasing number of very young and unproved companies.
2.4 Value IPOs
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Most of the literatures regarding IPOs suggest that pricing an IPO is based on the 
comparison of its operational and financial performance to other public owned companies 
in the same or similar industry. The firm and its underwriters make pricing decisions 
based on an analysis of market price ratios, with adjustments for firm-specific differences, 
and determine a minimum and maximum offer price. This method is called the 
comparable firm approach. This approach works best when a highly comparable group is 
available. Unlike the comparable firm approach, the discounted cash flow method asserts 
that asset price is based on its future cash flow. In many situations, it is difficult to 
estimate future cash flows and appropriate discount rate. Most IPO firms in the U.S. are 
young companies -  especially in the Internet bubble period -  and it is difficult to value 
these firms according to traditional discounted cash flow analysis. By contrast, the use of 
accounting numbers and firm multiples are widely recommended (Kim and Ritter 1999).
In Kim and Ritter’s (1999) article, accounting information and comparable firm 
multiples are used to value IPOs. Their sample includes 190 domestic operating IPOs 
from 1992 to 1993 which must have positive earnings per share and book value per share. 
Comparable firms are chosen with same 4 digit SIC code. These authors find that 
valuing IPOs on the basis of the price-to-eamings, price-to-sales, enterprise value-to sales, 
and enterprise value to operating cash flow ratios of comparables firms have only modest 
predictive ability without further adjustments. This is largely due to the wide variation of 
these ratios for young firms within an industry. The difficulties in valuing young firms 
could also explain the large offer price adjustment before IPO and high initial return for 
Internet firms.
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2.5 Literatures related to Internet IPOs
Internet related IPOs have begun to catch research interests within the past few 
years, especially after the tumultuous year, 1999 and 2000, which experienced a spurious 
amount of Internet related firms going public, and associated with extremely high initial 
returns. Most articles study how Internet-related firms were initially priced (Bartov et al, 
2002, Hand 2001). Researchers tried to find whether these stocks were rationally priced 
compared to non-Intemet related stocks. In these two articles, stock pricing is measured 
from two perspectives: accounting performance and web traffic.
Bartov et al. (2002) empirically investigated valuation of Internet firms at various 
stages of the IPO from mid point of pre-IPO price range, offer price, and first day closing 
price. Their analyses involve three types of explanatory variables. The first is a set of 
financial variables; earnings, cash flows, sales, and book values. The second is a set of 
non-financial variables; relative offer size and a measure capturing the relative position of 
the final offer price relative to its initial price range. The third is primarily a set of control 
variables which are important in explaining IPO valuations like underwriter rank, R&D 
expenditures and so on.
Their sample covers the 42-month period from January 1996 to June 1999. The 
initial sample included 233 Internet firms, however after screening according to a series 
of criteria, only 98 firms are left in the sample. In order to compare Internet firms with 
non-Intemet firms, 98 non-Intemet firms were chosen according to their IPO date and 
size. In their study, significant differences between the valuation of Internet firms and
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non-Intemet firms were found, especially at the initial IPO pricing stage and at the time 
of IPO. Specifically, the valuation of non-Intemet firms generally follows conventional 
wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative 
earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms is a departure 
from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced while negative cash flows are 
priced. When the dependent variables are changed from either offer price or first trading 
day closing price to initial return, earnings and cash flows lose their explanatory power. 
Specifically, the difference between offer price and first trading day closing price is 
insignificant related to any of the financial variables for either sample, except for annual 
sales growth which indicates that growing firms receive a more positive reaction from 
stock market.
Lingqvist and Wilhelm (2002) investigated IPO pricing from the year 1996 to 
2000. The results show that ownership structure and inside selling behavior can account 
for IPO underpricing because they reduce key decision-makers’ incentives to control 
underpricing. In 1996, pre-IPO insider ownership stakes averaged 63%, but by 2000 the 
ratio had declined to 51%. CEO stakes declined even more dramatically, from 22.8% to 
11.5%. Similarly, equity stakes held by venture capitals and investment banks, and those 
held by other corporations declined sharply over this period. Besides these, secondary 
sales of existing shares by all categories of pre-IPO owners and especially CEOs have 
declined sharply. On contrast, shares allocated to families and friends increased 
dramatically from 25% in 1996 to 76% in 1999 and to 91% in 2000. From the view of 
standard principal-agent theories, underpricing is significantly lower when insider 
ownership stakes are larger and when insiders sell more shares at the offer price.
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Empirical results support this prediction and find an association between IPO pricing in 
the dot-com bubble and changes in ownership structure and insider selling behavior. 
When controlling for above ownership structure and inside selling behavior, dummy 
variable coefficients associated with high-tech and Internet firms decline by more than 
60%. It should mention that the coefficients for Internet dummy variables are significant 
and positive in their regressions, which reflects that Internet firms earned super initial 
returns even after controlling ownership structures and inside selling behaviors.
Schultz and Zaman (2001) examine the motives for Internet firms. There are two 
commonly offered explanations for the propensity of Internet firms to go public. The 
first argument is that Internet firms are trying to grab market shares in an industry with 
large economics of scale. The second argument is that Internet firms are rushing to go 
public when Internet stocks are irrationally high. Results from this research provide only 
weak evidence that Internet firms go public to sell overpriced stock. The authors find that 
managers do not sell as many of their personal shares, and that insiders sell fewer of their 
own shares in Internet IPOs than do insiders associated with other IPOs. This is 
consistent with the idea that insiders believe that Internet stocks are fairly priced. 
Besides the main findings, evidence is also presented that Internet firms go public at an 
earlier stage in their life than other companies because the mean of earnings to post issue 
market capitalization are negative for Internet firms and positive for other IPOs.
Cooper et. al (2001) document a striking positive stock price reaction to the 
announcements of corporate name changes to Internet-related dotcom names. The sample 
in their study consists of 95 very small firms that change their names to include “.com” or 
“Internet.” An average abnormal return of 80% is found for ten days surrounding the
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announcement. The authors call this phenomenon “mania”, which is often related to 
certain glamour industries with both an enormous growth potential and uncertainty. 
Consequently, investors were extremely eager to buy shares of any firms that are 
involved in these industries. These results challenge the rational pricing hypothesis and 
lend more support to irrational investor behavior model.
Hand (2001) argues that if cross-sectional variation in the equity market values of 
Internet and non-Intemet stocks can be consistently explained by similar factors, it is 
unlikely that the pricing of Internet stocks has been entirely irrational. The author divides 
Internet firms into two groups: with material web traffic and without material web traffic. 
The two types of non-Intemet firms chosen include a random sample of public traded 
non-Intemet firms and a sample of non-Intemet firms that went public at the same time as 
Internet firms. Two time periods are estimated: March 2000 which is the peak of Internet 
firms going public and December 2000. Equity market value is measured as the closing 
price multiplied the number of shares outstanding at the offer date. The results show that 
equity markets value Internet firms with immaterial web traffic, with the analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings in 2001 and the long term rate of growth in earnings. This is not the 
case for firms with intensive web traffic. Beyond earnings, web traffic is positively priced. 
However, there is no evidence that the degree of public float and short interest, which are 
two proxies for supply and demand forces, are value-relevant to Internet firms. Overall, 
the author argues that there are enough similarities in the cross-sectional pricing of 
Internet and Non-Intemet firms, and it is unlikely that the pricing of Internet stocks 
during 2000 was entirely irrational.
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3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 valuation uncertainty, overreaction, and underwriter’s reputation
A large volume of IPO literature examines the first day return on IPOs and the 
explanations assume there exists information asymmetry in initial public offering market. 
Based on this explanation, underpricing is a compensation for uninformed investors. The 
higher the uncertainty surrounding an offering, the higher the degree of information 
asymmetry for uninformed investors, and thus results in higher degree underpricing. The 
changing risk composition hypothesis (Ritter, 1984) states the correlation between 
underpricing and firm’s ex ante uncertainty. The more uncertain the market is about the 
true value of the issuing firm, the higher the discount the company must offer to 
uninformed investors to submit the bids, therefore, underpricing should increase in the ex 
ante uncertainty surrounding an issue. Internet firms usually have smaller firm size, less 
profitable pre-IPO operating performance, fewer years in existence before going public, 
and unstable earnings compared to non-Intemet firms. Based on the changing risk 
composition theory, it is argued that the high initial return of Internet firms is derived 
from their high future uncertainties.
Hypothesis 1: Internet-related firms face higher future uncertainty than non-Internet 
firms, and thus lead to higher initial returns compared to non-Internet relatedfirms.
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According to the overreaction hypothesis, investors are likely to be overoptimistic 
with certain firms, such as those with potential earning growth or firms in a specific 
industry. Cooper et al. (2002) find a striking positive stock price reaction to the 
announcement of corporate name changes that included Internet-related dotcom names. 
So, based on Cooper’s finding, this study presents a hypothesis that the high initial return 
for Internet firms is also a dotcom phenomenon. The overreaction to Internet firms could 
begin in the pre-offering period, which is shown by underwriter’s upward price revision 
before setting the final offer price. Moreover, if investors were simply overoptimistic 
with Internet firms on the first trading day, then one would expect to find that initial 
returns for Internet firms are not related to their fundamentals. This overreaction could be 
an artifact of a particular industry: the Internet. Thus, there was the tendency for 
everybody to try to find another Microsoft. Unlike Internet firms, non-Intemet firms are 
still priced rationally, so we would expect their initial returns to reflect their fundamentals. 
Basically, overreaction hypothesis is based on behavioral explanation; investors are 
optimistic to Internet firms and bidding initial trading price beyond fair value. Thus, in 
the first trading day, high initial return is anticipated.
Hypothesis 2: Investors are optimistic to Internet-related IPOs, and overreact to them. 
Investors have crowded the market for Internet issues, which lead to higher upward price 
revisions for Internet firms than for Non-Internet firms. Moreover, due to investors’ 
overreaction, pre-IPO fundamental variables are not relevant explanatory variables to 
initial returns for Internet relatedfirms
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Empirical studies related to IPOs’ long run performance have not reached 
consensus regarding whether IPO firms underperform their benchmarks. Several 
researchers find that IPO firms experience long run underperformance compared to 
benchmark firms and the most frequently cited studies are “The long run performance of 
initial public offerings” by Ritter (1991) and “ the New Issue Puzzle” by Loughran and 
Ritter (1995). However, Brov and Gompers (1997) argue that venture-backed IPOs do 
not significantly underperform, only the smallest nonventure-backed firms underperform 
compared to several benchmarks. Recently, Gompers and Lemer (2003) studied the 5- 
year performance after initial public offerings with 3,661 IPOs from 1935 to 1972. 
Gompers and Lemer find that the underperformance disappears when using cumulative 
abnormal returns instead of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. From a calendar-time 
analysis, IPO firms perform as same as the market. Ritter and Welch (2002) also argue 
that many of phenomena found in the IPO literature depend on the time period, thus it is 
necessary to explain the causes of such phenomena in their specific period. Internet firms 
experienced super high initial underpricing in the Internet bubble period, and if 
behavioral explanations like overreaction is true, then the long-run performance of 
Internet IPOs should follow a certain pattern that can be predicted by behavior theories. 
Thus, the rationale for investigating IPO’s long-run performance in this article is to test 
the proposed overreaction explanation to the extremely high initial underpricing of 
Internet firms in the Internet bubble period. It is also believed that Internet IPOs can be 
employed as a good means of testing investors’ overreaction, since Cooper et al (2003) 
find that investors reacted positively to firms changing their names to “dot com.”
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Empirical findings to support behavioral theory that individuals often violate 
Bayes’ rule and rational choices are numerous. For example, DeBondt and Thaler (1995) 
demonstrate that buying past losers and selling past winners is a profitable trading 
strategy. Fama (1992) also shows that firm size and market to book ratio are powerful 
predictors of a firm’s return while market Beta does not seem to explain the results. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that “value strategy” earns significantly 
positive abnormal returns. Findings of market anomalies in the IPO field are also fruitful, 
such as IPO underpricing and long run underperformance. Jaggia and Thosar (2004) 
propose that the overheated high-tech IPO environment of late 1990s is an ideal testing 
period for behavioral theories. In their study, DHS overreaction framework (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998) is tested and they find that overreaction continued 
in the short run with a sample of 301 high tech companies issued from January 1, 1998 to 
October 30,1999.
According to DHS’ overreaction framework, investors are overconfident and 
overreact to private signals. In addition, self-attribution bias makes overreaction continue 
in the short run, and finally, the long-run price reversal is expected due to further release 
of public information. Jaggia and Thosar (2004) propose an overreaction explanation for 
IPOs based on the DHS framework. When given a favorable signal, investors’ 
overconfidence pushes the stock price above its rational expected level at time 1. If 
investors observe that public signals are consistent with their initial assessment, self­
attribution bias will drive the price even higher, and further away from the rational level 
at time 2. The arrival of later public information gradually induces the price back to the 
fundamental value at time 3. According to this overreaction proposal, overreacted IPOs
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will exhibit positive momentum in the short run and a price reversal in the long run. 
Jaggia and Thosar (2004) only test the DHS overreaction hypothesis in the short run (6 
months after IPO) in a sample of 301 high-tech IPOs, and find that momentum variables 
are important to explain firm’s short run performance, which is consistent with 
overreaction prediction. If investors do overreact to Internet-related firms in the initial 
return period, positive price momentum in the short run and a price reversal in the long 
run for Internet firms would be expected after controlling for other factors, such as 
changes of operating performance, size, and market to book ratio.
Hypothesis 3: In the short run, due to investors’ overreaction, Internet firms would 
exhibit a positive price momentum; however, in the long-run, Internet-related firms 
cannot sustain abnormally high returns, especially for those firms which experienced 
spuriously high initial returns. Price reversal is expected and the market performance in 
the long run for Internet firms is positively related to their pre-IPO performances.
In the Internet bubble period, do prestigious underwriters relaxed their 
underwriting standards and took public an increasing number of very young and 
unprofitable companies? If this is the case, it should be found that pre-IPO operating 
performance are positively related underwriters ranking for non-Intemet firms, but this 
relation does not hold for Internet firms.
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Hypothesis 4: With respect to underwriter’s self selection, high reputation underwriters 
pick up non-Internet firms with better pre-IPO operating performance, but they tend not 
to consider pre-IPO operating performance for Internet firms.
3.2 Sample Selection and Data Sources
The sample is comprised of 744 initial public offerings from January 1, 1999 to 
December 31, 2000. The reason the sample is restricted to these specific time period is 
the spurious amount of Internet IPOs within these two years (table one). The total number 
of Internet firms is 313 for 1999 and 164 for 2000. In this period, the ratio of Internet 
firms to total offerings is much higher than the ratios for other years. This timeframe is 
commonly referred to as the Internet Bubble period (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). The 
sample firms are restricted in the year 1999 and 2000 since it is a good time period to test 
overreaction hypothesis.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Sample firms are identified, and data collected from Edgar-online for firms priced 
between January 1 1999 and January 1 2001. Based on this time limitation, 1117 firms 
were selected. Several criteria are set to clean the final sample: (1) the offering is not an 
ADR, which resulted in the exclusion of 145 firms, (2) Shares must be traded in NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ, which lessened the sample by another 88 firms, (3) the company 
is included in the CRSP daily database, which excluded another 13 firms, (4) the offering 
is not a financial company and involves common stock only, 81 close end funds, REITs, 
unit offerings, and other types of financial companies are excluded, (5) the IPO must
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have complete data (including offer price, date, amount, and shares offered), which 
excludes 14 more firms, (6) a offer must have an offer price of $5 or more, lessening the 
sample by 3, (7) the IPO is not combined with warrants or rights, which excludes 10 
firms, (8) the offer can be found in COMPUSTAT, excluding 16 more firms. After 
refining the sample by these criteria, 744 firms are included in the final sample (3 firms 
have other missing data, see table 2).
[Insert Table 2 here]
Offering data like offer price, offer date, number of share offered, and name of the 
underwriters are collected from Edgar-online. Internet companies are also identified via 
Edgar-online, as indicated by the Edgar-online “Internet -related” classification. This is 
necessary because SIC codes for Internet firms vary widely. It is almost impossible to 
identify Internet stocks from SIC listings because they carry numerous two-digit SIC 
codes (Schultz and Zaman 2001). For example, the SIC code for Yahoo is 73, 
Amazon.com is 59, and Priceline.com is 47, each of which is shared with non-Intemet 
firms. In our sample, most Internet firms have 73,59,48, 36, and 35 as the first two digital 
of SIC code. The final sample includes 376 Internet firms and 368 non-Intemet firms.
The closing price on offer date, shares outstanding, and 24-month daily returns 
are gathered from CRSP database. Firm CUSIP numbers are obtained from CRSP, and 
the same firms are identified in COMPUSTAT using the CUSIP number obtained from 
CRSP. Previous year performance data are collected from COMPUSTAT, which 
includes total assets, sales, net income, total debt, and cash flow from operations. Firms’ 
total sales before offering was also made available through Edgar-online. For example, 
several consecutive annual sales or quarterly sales can be found from a firms’ prospectus.
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These sales figures are the basis for calculating sales growth rate. Underwriter’s ranking 
is collected from Jay Ritter’s personal web site. Firms’ founded year is obtained from 
Business & Company Resource Center database.
3.3 Description of variables
3.3.1 Offering variables
Offering variables include offer price, offer date, offer amount, change in offer 
range, change in offer price, price revision, offering size, float, years of existing before 
IPO, and Internet dummy. The offer price is normally set one day before the actual 
trading day. In other words, the trading date is one day after the pricing day. For example, 
Priceline.com is priced at $16 on March 29 1999 (pricing date), and began trading on 
NASDAQ on March 30 1999 (IPO trading date). Underwriters assign an estimated offer 
price range before setting the final offer price. The mid point of the offer range is 
commonly used in academic research. For example, if the offer range for Priceline.com 
is $12 to $14, then the mid point of offer range is $13.
The change in offer range is measured as the ratio of price difference between the 
midpoint of initial offer range and final offer range to midpoint of initial offer range. For 
example, the firm Manufactures Services LTD set its offer price range at $17 to $19 on 
April 28 2000. On Jun 1 2000, the company decided to decrease the offer range to $15 to 
$17. The initial mid point of offer range is $18 ((19-17)/2) and the final midpoint of offer 
range is $16 ((17-15)/2). In this case, change in offer range can be calculated as (16- 
18)/16=-.l 1. If a company never announced an increase or decrease its offer price range,
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its change in offer range should be zero, which means that the firm had estimated the 
share demand properly at the first place. Change in offer range is an important 
measurement according to book building theory because the final share price and share 
allocation are determined by share demands expressed by investors, thus underwriters 
would like to adjust the offer price range with expressed demand.
Change in offer price measures the position of final offer price relative to the mid 
point of final price range. It is calculated as (offer price -  mid point of final offer price 
range)/mid point of final offer price range. For example, Price line .com set its offer price 
on $16. Before this, its final price range is from $12 to $14, which indicates the midpoint 
of final price range is $13. Then the Change in offer price should be 0.2308 (16-13/13). 
Like the variable change in offer range, it is also a market indicator of share demand.
Price revision measures the ratio of price difference between offer price and 
midpoint of initial offer price range to mid point of initial offer price range. It includes 
two price adjustments, change in offer range and change in offer price. In other words, 
price revision can also be calculated as: (1 + change in offer range) * (change in offer 
price) -  1.
In this research, offering size is measured as the amount of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the offer price. It is well known that firm’s size can partly explain its daily 
return (Fama and French 1992). Small size firms would earn higher returns than large 
firms.
Another important variable is Float. Float represents the amount of shares issued 
in the IPO as a percentage of total shares outstanding. High float can be viewed as a high 
supply of shares, and thus stock should be priced low, or be less under-priced (Bartov et
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al. 2002). Moreover, Schultzen and Zaman (2001) have shown that greater relative 
insider ownership (i.e, low float) should be a positive signal to investors because it 
indicates that insiders are less likely to sell shares to catch the benefit of overpricing. 
From the view of agency cost, low float, which means high insider ownership, represents 
less conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.
Age (years existing before IPO) is calculated as number of years between IPO 
year and founded year. The months in the founded year and IPO year are neglected. For 
example, ACLARA BIOSCIENCES INC went public on March 21 2000 and its founded 
year is in 1995, then 5 years is its years existing before IPO.
In addition, an Internet dummy variable was included. If an offer is Internet 
related, then the variable is equal to 1, or 0 if the offer is not related to the Internet. 
Bartov (2002) states that valuation of Internet stocks is difficult because not only do 
Internet firms invest highly in intangible assets, but also attempt to transform the way in 
which business is transacted. In addition, the vast majority of Internet companies are 
young growth firms with little or even negative earnings. These characters of Internet 
firms further contribute to the substantial uncertainty that is associated with the valuation 
of Internet stocks. One of focuses of this study is to understand whether investors 
rationally value firms in the new (Internet) industry, or the irrational so-called “dotcom” 
fad exists.
3.3.2 Firms pre-offering operating performance variables
All firms’ pre-offering operating performance is relative to year -1, which is the 
year prior to the IPO. Total sales is COMPUSTAT data item 12. Net income is
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COMPUSTAT data item 18, which represents the income of a company after all 
expenses, including special items, income taxes, and minority interest. Operating cash 
flow is calculated as income after all expenses plus depreciation and amortization 
(COMPUSTAT: IB+DP). Total debt is the sum of total long term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities (COMPUSTAT: DLTT + DLC). Total asset, which is COMPUSTAT 
item 6, represents current asset plus net property and equipment plus other non-current 
assets like intangible asset.
The operating performance variables are categorized into three groups: the first is 
operating performance on total asset (including sales on asset, net income on asset, cash 
flow on asset, and total debt on asset); The second is operating performance on shares 
outstanding (including sales per share, net income per share, cash flow per share, and 
total debt per share); The last one is sales growth rate measured as the change of sales 
between year -1 and year -2  divided by sales in year -2.
3.3.3 Initial returns and long-run returns
Returns are calculated for two intervals: the initial return period (normally 1 day) 
and the after market period which is defined as the 36 months after the IPO, exclusive of 
the initial return period. The initial return is defined as the percentage difference between 
first day closing price and the offering price. The first day close pricing is listed on the 
CRSP daily return tape.
Initial return = (close price- offer price)/ offer price
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Three years after market performance is used because the sample is from 1999 to 
2000, and the CRSP daily return tape for 2004 is not available. The initial return date is 
defined as month 0, and the aftermarket period includes the following 24 months. Each 
month is defined as successive 21-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. In other 
words, month 1 consists of event days 2-22, month 2 consists event days 23-43, etc. For 
IPOs that are delisted before their 2 years anniversary, the aftermarket period is truncated 
on the last trading day.
Similar as returns calculated by Ritter (1991), daily benchmark-adjusted return is 
obtained as the daily raw return minus the daily bench mark return. The daily benchmark 
returns are the value-weighted NYSE NASDAK, and AMEX index return (CRSP index 
return 100080).
The benchmark-adjusted return for stock i in day d is defined as:
ARld = r id~rmd
Each firm time period t buy and hold and cumulative return are defined as:
b h r „ =n(i+'i-)-n<i +  rm d ) d=l to t
CARit = X ARid d=l to t 
The average buy and hold and cumulative returns are:
BHR = 1/n I  (BHRit) (i= 1 to n)
CAR = 1/n I  (CARit) (i= 1 to n)
3.3.4 Underwriter’s ranking
The rankings of underwriter’s reputation are from Jay Ritter’s IPO data sources. 
This data is based on the May 1999 Goldman Sachs prospectus which lists over 120
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underwriters. When a firm goes public, the underwriting section lists all the investment 
banking firms that are part of the underwriting syndicate. More prestigious underwriters 
are listed higher in the underwriting section, in brackets, with the underwriters in higher 
brackets underwriting more shares. Managing and co-managing underwriters are assigned 
a ranking of 9, and other underwriters given a ranking based on the bracket they are in. If 
an underwriter is not in Goldman Sachs prospectus, it is assigned a ranking 1 or 2 if they 
were penny stock underwriters that had been subject to enforcement actions by the SEC 
during 1995-1999. All other remaining underwriter’s rankings are determined by an 
independent and disinterested investment banking expert. In order to distinguish with 
Carter and Manaster, Dark, and Singh ‘s ranking, Ritter’s ranking are integers followed 
by a 0.1. Therefore, ranking in this system ranges from 1.1 to 9.1. In this study, 
underwriter’s ranking is also grouped to three categories: most prestigious underwriters, 
which rank 9.1; prestigious underwriters ranking 8.1; and not prestigious underwriters 
with any ranking less than 8.1.
3.4 Description of the sample firms
Table 3 shows the descriptive offer statistics of the sample IPOs. It is noted that 
Internet firms and non-Intemet firms are almost evenly distributed in the year 1999 and 
2000. There are 376 Internet related and 368 non-Intemet related firms in the two years. 
A comparison of these two groups shows that Internet firms have significantly smaller 
numbers with respect to shares offered, shares outstanding, issue size, issue amount, and 
float rate. Interestingly, the float rate for Internet firms is .2328 and .3160 for Non-
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Internet firms, which is consistent with the findings by Schultzen and Zaman (2001). 
These authors find that Internet firms have relatively high insider ownership, therefore 
low float rate, which they argue should be a positive signal to investors because it 
indicates that insiders are less likely to sell shares to bail out.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Internet firms have a larger change in offer range and change in offer price than 
non-Intemet firms. For example, change in offer range and change in offer price 
are .1405 and .0756 for Internet firms, but they are only .0325 and .0194 for non-Intemet 
firms, implies that Internet shares were more popular. These numbers are positive for 
both groups, indicating that share demand had been underestimated for both Internet 
related and non-Intemet related firms. As evidenced by initial returns, Internet firms’ 
underpricing is much more pronounced than non-Intemet firms (with .8858 and .4473 
respectively), and investors are anxious to acquire these shares even though prices are 
adjusted upward before the IPO.
The variable underwriter’s rank does not show significant difference between 
Internet and non-Intemet firms. Both underwriters’ rankings are high (over 8.0). The 
evidence is inconsistent with the argument of “the competitive devaluation of 
underwriting standards” because it is commonly assumed that prestigious underwriters 
refused to undertake young and unproved companies, which was true in the 1980s and 
earlier (Loughran and Ritter 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
4. Pre-IPO operating performance, price revision, and underpricing
4.1 Pre-IPO operating performance and ex ante uncertainty.
According to the changing risk composition hypothesis, the greater the ex ante 
uncertainty about an issue, the greater the required compensation to investors for 
becoming informed. In other words, high risk issues are expected to be underpriced more 
than other issues. The risk here, however, is not systematic beta-type risk, but “the 
uncertainty uninformed investors have regarding the after market price.” (Ritter, 1984) 
While this measure of risk cannot be directly observable, in this study, several proxies 
based upon pre-IPO operating performance and offering characteristics will be used.
Internet IPOs are anticipated as high risk offerings compared to non-Intemet 
offerings because they are young, less established (low pre-IPO operating performance), 
and unstable regarding sales. For small firms, with little or no operating history and 
small or even negative earnings, it is reasonable to expect a great deal of uncertainty with 
respect to the appropriate price per share. Uncertainty forces issuers to underprice these 
offerings substantially. Non-Intemet firms, with large earnings and long pre-IPO 
operating history, are presumably easier to value, and one would expect that on average, 
less money would to be left on the table to compensate investors.
Table 4 shows differences in the issuing firm’s age before IPO and absolute 
operating performances between Internet and Non-Intemet groups. It is noted that 
Internet firms have less years existing before IPO (5.45) than that for non-Intemet firms 
(13.14), which confirms the assertion that most Internet firms are very young firms. The
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results also show that Internet firms were smaller in size, with much less sales, earnings, 
cash flows, and total assets. Moreover, panel B of Table 4 reports the number of firms 
that have negative earnings and cash flows from operation before IPO. Of the sample, 
338 out of 376 Internet firms and 235 out of 368 non-Intemet firms have negative pre- 
IPO earnings. These results preliminarily support the assertion that Internet firms, as a 
group, have highly uncertain futures.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Table 5 shows issuing firms’ operating performance scaled by total assets and 
shares outstanding. The mean of income to assets, cash flow to assets, income to shares 
outstanding, and cash flow to shares outstanding are all negative for both Internet and 
Non-Intemet firms. Earnings per share are -.4628 and -.1683 for the two groups 
respectively, and they are similar to Bartov et al (2002) results, which have earnings per 
share -0.66 for Internet firms and -0.14 for Non-Intemet firms between January 1996 to 
June 1999 (n = 98 IPOs). Unlike net income and cash flow measures, there are no 
significant differences for debt measures between Internet firm and non-Intemet firms. 
Sales growth rate is significantly higher for Internet firms (5.3911) than for Non-Intemet 
firms (3.1050), which clearly demonstrates that Internet firms have unstable sales -  or 
high future uncertainty. Overall, the results show that Internet firms are young, with 
worse pre-IPO performance, but higher sales growth rate than Non-Intemet firms. Results 
in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the proposed hypothesis that Internet firms face 
greater uncertainty than non-Intemet firms.
[Insert Table 5 here]
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4.2 Evidence on pre-IPO operating performance and price revision
Examination of IPO’ price revision is done in two stages. In the first stage, the 
variable change in offer range is calculated as (midpoint of final offer range -  midpoint 
of initial offer range)/ midpoint of initial offer range. In the second stage, the change of 
offer price is measured by subtracting the midpoint of final offer range from the IPO 
offer price, and dividing by the midpoint of final price range. The relation of the three 
prices, mid point of initial offer price range, mid point of final offer price range, and final 
offer price are illustrated in the time line below using ABOUT.COM as an example. 




On 2/25/99 the company set its initial price range $12 to $14, and on 3/22/99 it 
increased the range to $23 to $25. Finally, on 3/23/99 it set its offer price on $25. In the 
first stage, the change in offer range = (24-13)/13= .8461. In the second stage, the 
change in offer price= (25-24)/24=.0417. The total price revision =(25-13)/13 = .9231
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of change in offer range, change in offer 
price, and total price revision between Internet firms and Non-Internet firms. These 
variables are used to create a matrix of firms according to zero-centered levels (e.g., <0, 
=0, and >0) with regard to each variable. According to book building theory, 
underwriters adjust the offer price range and the final offer price according to revealed
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information by investors. Because firms with higher future uncertainty benefit more from 
investors’ truthful revelation of share demand, thus high price revisions are expected for 
firms with high ex ante uncertainty. It is also argued that investors are crowded in 
Internet firms and lead to larger upward price revision for Internet firms than for non- 
Internet firms. The results in Table 6 show that price revisions are not distributed 
proportionally among Internet and Non-Internet firms. Internet firms tend to experience 
price upward revision, while non-Internet firms seem to exhibit price revision tendencies 
that are more equally distributed between upward and downward revisions. The upward 
price adjustment measured as change in offer range, change in offer price, and price 
revision are .3779, .1340, and .3829 for Internet firms, which are larger than non-Internet 
firms at .3014, .1325, and .2590. Initial returns are positively related to price revision. 
Upward price revision comes with high initial return (1.1400 and .7963) and downward 
price revision comes with low initial return (.1150 and .0795) for both Internet and non- 
Internet firms. In other words, the highest initial return firms are more likely experienced 
upward price revision, and the lowest initial returns firms are more likely experienced 
downward price revision. Moreover, the overall initial returns for Internet firms are 
larger than initial returns for Non-Internet firms among each price adjustment group. 
These results are consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, which states that investors 
are very optimistic to Internet offerings, thus lift up their offer prices.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The relationship between pre-IPO performance and price revision is unclear 
(results are reported in Table 7). For Non-Internet firms, zero price revision firms show 
the best performance in sales to total assets, while upward price revision firms
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
experienced the highest income and cash flow to total assets. Non-Internet firms that 
experienced upward price revision have the lowest debt to total assets (.3004). Growth 
rate in sales is important to the valuation of IPOs, but the results show that only non- 
Internet firms with the greatest growth rate (4.1956) experienced upward price revision. 
There does not exist a clear pattern for price revision of Internet firms regarding their 
sales growth rate. No price revision firms experienced almost same sales growth rate as 
upward price revision firms.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Yi (2001) finds that only firms going public with negative earnings had 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns over a 3-year period after going public. 
Therefore, the author suggests that investors may have been too optimistic about future 
prospects of the IPO firms, especially those that had negative earnings. If investors just 
overreact to negative earning firms, then it is expected the both Internet and Non-Internet 
firms with negative earnings would have similar price revisions and initial returns. Table 
8 shows the results of price revision and initial returns between positive and negative pre- 
IPO earning and cash flow groups. It is expected that negative earning firms would have 
greater upward price revision and initial returns because investors are likely to be 
overoptimistic about negative earning firms. The results in table 8 are consistent with 
this expectation that firms with negative net income and cash flow per share before IPO 
experience larger price revisions and initial returns. However, Table 8 also shows that 
Internet firms always experience higher price revision and initial returns than those of 
Non-Internet firms, therefore, the hypothesis that investors overreact to Internet firms is 
supported.
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4.3 Analysis of firm’s initial underpricing
Table 9 gives the results of firms’ initial returns on their pre-IPO operating 
performance by quintile. It is expected that the worst performed firms should have 
highest initial returns. However, based on the results in Table 8, there does not exist 
strong evidence to show the relation between pre-IPO operating performance and initial 
returns. The only clear results are the most under-priced firms are those with greatest 
annual sales growth rate, whose initial return are 1.087 and .955 for Internet and Non- 
Internet firms. Compared to these, the initial return in the lowest sales growth group 
are .637 and .271 respectively. The least under-priced non-Internet firms are those that 
have the highest pre-IPO performance such as sales to assets (.236), cash flow per share 
(.274), or income per share (.338). For Internet firms, the highest income per share and 
cash flow per share quintiles have the lowest initial return: .658 and .541. These results 
are consistent with proposed hypothesis that the greater the fundamental uncertainty 
about a stock issue, the greater the required compensation to investors for becoming 
informed, in other wards, higher underpricing.
[Insert Table 9 here]
It is interesting to see the differences in pre-IPO operating performance between 
“extra hot” IPOs and “extra cold” IPOs. In consistent with previous study (Tech, Welch, 
and Wong 1998), extra-cold IPOs are offers with initial return equal or less than zero; 
Cold IPOs are offers with initial return great than zero but equal or less than 10%; Hot
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IPOs are offers with initial return great than 10% but less or equal 60%; and extra-hot 
IPOs are offers with initial return more than 60%. Table 10 represents the results of pre- 
IPO performance along the four “hot-cold” typology categories. It is very interesting to 
note that Internet and Non-Internet firms show divergent to be valued in growth rate. For 
example, extra-cold and extra-hot Internet firms have growth rate .34891and 6.2257, 
while extra-cold and extra-hot non-Internet firms have growth rate 1.8512 and 5.5920. 
The pattern for non-Intemet firms is clear, initial returns are positively related sales 
growth rate. Based on evidence here, changing risk composition hypothesis can explain 
initial return for non-Intemet firms well because growth rate is a good proxy for future 
uncertainty.
[Insert Table 10 here]
4.4 Regression results
The correlations among Pre-IPO performances ratios are represented in table 11. 
As we assumed, most measures are highly correlated, like earnings per share and cash 
flow per share. In this study, only significantly uncorrelated measures, such as sales to 
asset and debt to asset, are included in a single regression.
[Insert Table 11 here]
4.4.1 OLS regression with price revision as the dependent variable
As stated before, price revision is measured as the ratio of price difference 
between the offer price and the mid point of the initial price range to the midpoint of
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initial price range. Price revision is assumed to reflect information acquired from 
informed investors. Thus, it can be concluded that firms with higher future uncertainty 
benefit more from investors’ truthful revelation of share demand, thus have high price 
revisions. However, it should be mentioned that firms are more likely to withdraw in 
response to negative news and increase offer price in responds to positive news, and that 
only firms that have actual offerings are included in this sample. That is, there is a self 
selection bias.
Model 1:
P V {= Cd + fa  UNCERij +Yij CVy + iqDUMMYi + $
PV: price revision
UNCER: uncertainty variables; including pre-IPO operating performance measures, firm 
size, and firm age.
CV: control variables; including underwriter’s ranking and float.
DUMMY: Internet dummy variables.
According to proposed hypothesis, Internet firms have higher future uncertainty 
than Non-Intemet firms, and as a result, have higher price revisions. Therefore, it is 
expected py is significantly correlated with price revisions. Among these uncertainty 
variables, sales growth rate, debt to assets, and debt per share should have positive signs, 
whereas firm size, age and other performance measures should have negative signs. Base 
on overreaction hypothesis, investors overreact to Internet firms, and iq should be 
significant and positive.
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Table 12 shows 6 regression results with price revision as the dependant variables. 
Debt to asset and debt per share have significantly negative coefficients (-0.0442 and -
0.0083), and their signs are inconsistent with the argument that high debt to assts or debt 
per share firms are higher future uncertainty firms, and should have higher price revisions. 
The coefficients of cash flow per share (-0.0191) and sales growth rate (0.0576) are 
significant and consistent with the expectation, which states that high cash flow per share 
or low growth rate firms have less future uncertainties. The most powerful explanatory 
variable is age. It is significantly negative in all regressions, and confirms the statement 
that young firms are riskier and uncertain. The coefficient of firm’s size is positive, 
which is also inconsistent with “uncertainty” argument because small size is 
demonstrably associated with high uncertainty. It is also interesting to note that firms 
underwritten by more prestigious underwriters have experienced less price revision which 
is inconsistent with the result in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm’ (2001) study (sample period is 
from 1996 to 2000). In their study, firms underwritten by more prestigious underwriters 
have a tendency toward greater price revision. Their interpretation is that more 
prestigious underwriters are chosen by venture-backed or older firms, those filing larger 
offers, and companies with greater valuation uncertainty. Float is also significantly 
positive in every regression. As stated before, float represents the amount of shares issued 
in the IPO as a percentage of total shares outstanding, and thus high float can be view as 
the high supply of shares. The results in Table 12 reveal that high float firms have 
experienced larger price revision than low float firms, which counters the argument that 
insiders should bargain for more aggressive positive revision when their stakes are larger.
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In Table 12, the dummy variable INTERNET is significant in each regression after 
controlling for firms’ uncertainty. The coefficient is around .15, and means that every 
Internet firm has experienced an average upward price revision of 15%. This result 
supports the hypothesis that investors tend to be more optimistic about Internet firms, 
even in the book-building period.
[Insert Table 12 here]
4.4.2 Regression results with Initial Return as the Dependent Variable 
Model 2:
INIRET i=Cb + fa  UNCERij + y v CVij+ IQ DUMMY; + e{
INIRET: initial returns
UNCER: uncertainty variables; including pre-IPO operating performance measures, firm 
size, and firm age.
CV: control variables; including underwriter’s ranking and float.
DUMMY: Internet dummy variables.
Based on the results in Table 13, regarding pre-IPO performance, only debt to 
assets, debt per share, and growth rate are significant predictors of initial returns. Similar 
as the pre-session analysis, the negative sign of debt to assets and debt per share are not 
expected. But from the behavior explanation, investors might crowd out these firms 
because high debt to asset and high debt per share are indicators of greater financial risk. 
Unlike debt to asset or debt per share, growth rate is an important measure for firm’s
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stable future earnings. According to changing risk composition hypothesis, underwriters 
need to compensate uninformed investors in value high uncertainty firms, thus the 
coefficient of growth rate should be positive. It should mention that irrational investors 
are likely to extrapolate firm’s growth and expect a high future growth rate. Both 
arguments expect growth rate has a positive coefficient on initial return. The results are 
consistent with the proposed hypothesis since the coefficient for growth rate is 0.2075, 
and significant at .05 level.
Underwriters’ rank was insignificant with underpricing as a dependent variable, 
which is consistent with Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2001)’ finding. The Internet dummy 
variable is still significant in all regressions. The smallest coefficient for Internet dummy 
is .3168, which reflect the fact that Internet firms earn average over 30% initial returns 
after controlling for firm’s specific uncertainties. This finding is highly consistent with 
overreaction hypothesis.
[Insert Table 13 here]
In order to test the overreaction hypothesis further, the sample is split between 
Internet firms and non-Intemet firms, and comparative analysis is conducted, with initial 
return as the dependent variable. Each sub-sample contains over 300 firms, with the 
expected result that fundamentals will not be associated with initial returns for Internet 
firms. This is reasonable, because investment in Internet firms is hypothesized to be 
irrational. Conversely, non-Intemet firms should see a strong association between 
fundamentals and initial returns, since investors are hypothesized to behave rationally.
The results in Table 14 support the overreaction hypothesis. No pre-IPO 
performance measures except sales growth rate are significant for Internet firms. Sales
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
growth rate is marginally significant with a coefficient .1389. Moreover, Age also lost its 
explanatory power. Unlike Internet firms, results in Table 15 represent that debt to 
assets, debt per share, and growth rate are significant at .01 level with initial return as the 
dependent variable for Non-Intemet firms. Another uncertainty variable, age, is highly 
significant as expected. The only commonly significant variables are size and price 
revision for both Internet and Non-Intemet firms. Price revision alone can explain over 
42% and 38% underpricing for both Internet and Non-Intemet firms. Its coefficients are 
1.7807 (Table 14, regression 7) for Internet firms and 1.4922 (Table 15 regression 7) for 
Non-Intemet firms.
[Insert table 14 and Table 15 here]
Overall, the results for price revision and initial return are consistent with the 
changing risk composition and overreaction hypotheses. Among all the uncertainty 
measures, sales growth rate and age are most powerful and have effects on both price 
revisions and initial returns. The higher the sales growth rate, or the smaller the age 
before IPO, the higher degree of price revisions and initial returns are. Cash flow per 
share is only useful to explain price revisions, not initial returns. Debt per share, debt to 
assets, and size are significant variables, but their signs are not as expected. Internet 
dummy variables are positively significant in both price revisions and initial returns after 
controlling firms’ uncertainties. Moreover, fundamental variables like debt to assets and 
debt per share cannot explain initial returns for Internet firms at all, and the overreaction 
hypothesis is preliminary supported.
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5.1 Overreaction and firm’s after market performance
Empirical studies related to IPOs’ long run performance have not reached 
consensus regarding whether IPO firms underperform their benchmarks. Several 
researchers found that IPO firms experienced long run underperformance compared to 
benchmark firms and the most frequently cited studies are “The long run performance of 
initial public offerings” by Ritter (1991) and “ the New Issue Puzzle” by Loughran and 
Ritter (1995). However, Brov and Gompers (1997) argue that venture-backed IPOs do 
not significantly underperform, only the smallest nonventure-backed firms underperform 
compared to several benchmarks. Recently, Gompers and Lemer (2003) studied the 5- 
year performance after initial public offerings with 3661 IPOs from 1935 to 1972. 
Gompers and Lemer find that the underperformance disappears when using cumulative 
abnormal returns instead of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. From a calendar-time 
analysis, IPO firms perform as same as the market. Ritter and Welch (2002) also argue 
that many of phenomena found in the IPO literature depend on the time period, thus it is 
necessary to explain the causes of such phenomena in their specific period. Internet firms 
experienced super high initial underpricing in the Internet bubble period, and if 
behavioral explanations like overreaction is true, then the long-mn performance of 
Internet IPOs should follow a certain pattern that can be predicted by behavior theories. 
Thus the rationale for investigating IPO’s long-mn performance in this article is to test 
the proposed overreaction explanation to the extremely high initial underpricing of
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Internet firms in the Internet bubble period. The most common explanation of IPO’s 
initial underpricing is based on the asymmetric information theory, such as the risk 
composition hypothesis. However, few articles really test the overreaction hypothesis, 
even though researchers like to mention that the long-run underperformance could be due 
to investors’ initial overreaction. It is also believed that Internet IPOs can be employed 
as a good means of testing investors’ overreaction, since Cooper et al (2003) have 
preliminarily found that investors reacted positively to firms changing their names to “dot 
com.”
Empirical findings to support behavioral theory that individuals often violate 
Bayes’ rule and rational choices are numerous. For example, DeBondt and Thaler (1995) 
demonstrate that buying past losers and selling past winners is a profitable trading 
strategy. Fama (1992) also shows that firm size and market to book ratio are powerful 
predictors of a firm’s return while market Beta does not seem to explain the results. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that “value strategy” earns significantly 
positive abnormal returns. Findings of market anomalies in the IPO field are also fruitful, 
such as IPO underpricing and long run underperformance. Jaggia and Thosar (2004) 
proposed that the overheated high-tech IPO environment of late 1990s is an ideal testing 
period for behavioral theories. In their study, DHS overreaction framework (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998) is tested and they find that overreaction continued 
in the short run with a sample of 301 high tech companies issued from January 1,1998 to 
October 30,1999.
According to DHL’ overreaction framework, investors are overconfident and 
overreact to private signals. In addition, self -attribution bias makes overreaction
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continue in the short run, and finally, the long-run price reversal is expected due to 
further release of public information. Jaggia and Thosar (2004) proposed an overreaction 
explanation for IPOs based on the DHL framework. When given a favorable signal, 
investors’ overconfidence pushes the stock price above its rational expected level at time
1. If investors observe that public signals are consistent with their initial assessment, self- 
attribution bias will drive the price even higher, and further away from the rational level 
at time 2. The arrival of later public information gradually induces the price back to the 
fundamental value at time 3. According to this overreaction proposal, overreacted IPOs 
will exhibit positive momentum in the short run and a price reversal in the long run. 
Jaggia and Thosar (2004) only test the DHS overreaction hypothesis in the short run (6 
months after IPO) in a sample of 301high-tech IPOs, and found that momentum variables 
are important to explain firm’s short run performance, which is consistent with 
overreaction prediction. Unlike Jaggia and Thosar’s (2004) work, this article tests both 
short run (6-month) and long run (36-month) aftermarket performances using a more 
broad pre-IPO operating performances as proxies for firms’ fundamentals. The sample 
included not only Internet firms, but also Non-Intemet firms with the aim of testing the 
overreaction hypothesis as a way to explain the huge initial return differences between 
Internet and Non-Intemet IPOs. If investors do overreact to Internet-related firms in the 
initial return period, positive price momentum in the short run and a price reversal in the 
long run for Internet firms would be expected after controlling for other factors, such as 
changes of operating performance, size, and market to book ratio.
5.2 Empirical results
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All sample firms’ buy-and-hold or cumulative index-adjusted returns are 
calculated in the 36-month period after offerings. The results are shown in Table 16, in 
which it can be seen that Internet firms and non-Intemet firms exhibit significantly 
different buy-and-hold returns at month 4 and month 5. For example, at month 5, the buy- 
and-hold return for Internet firms is .3541, which is significantly higher than that of Non- 
Intemet firms, which is only .1325. However, beginning at month 11, Internet firms 
show significantly lower buy-and-hold returns than non-Intemet firms. By the end of the 
36th month after initial public offerings, the buy-and-hold return for Internet firms is - 
.5368, and -.0156 for Non-Internet firms. Figure 1 clearly shows the performance pattern 
for both types of firms. It is preliminary evidence that Internet firms exhibit positive price 
momentum in the short ran and price reversal in the long ran.
[Insert Table 16, Figure 1 and 2 here]
It is interested to know whether firms’ long run market performances are related 
to their pre-IPO performances, or in other words, whether pre-IPO fundamental values 
affect firms’ long ran performances. In order to answer this question, 3-year buy-and- 
hold index adjusted returns are categorized by firms’ pre-IPO performance quartiles, 
which is shown in Table 17. There appears to be a strong pattern for Non-Intemet firms 
that the best pre-IPO performed firms had the highest 3 years buy-and-hold returns than 
other firms. For example, non-Intemet firms with the highest sales to total assets, net 
income to total assets, cash flow to total assets, sales per share, earnings per share, and 
cash flow per share earned the highest 3- year buy-and-hold returns. For Internet firms, 
the 3 -year buy-and-hold returns were all negative for every pre-IPO operating
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
performance quartiles. These returns are slightly higher in the highest sales per share, 
earnings per share, and cash flow per share categories.
[Insert Table 17 here]
Table 18 shows the results of 6-month and 3-year buy-and-hold returns among 
four initial return groups. In the 6-month period, the hot and extra-hot Internet firms 
earned much higher returns (.3142 and .1808) than Non-Intemet firms (.1569 and -.1482). 
However, in the 3- year after market period, it is very clear that Internet firms earned 
lower returns than Non-Intemet firms in every category. For both Internet and non- 
Intemet firms, extra-cold IPOs had the highest returns. These return data preliminarily 
show that Internet firms had fair short-run but poor long-mn performances compared to 
Non-Intemet firms.
[Insert Table 18 here]
As Fama and French (1992) found that size and market-to-book ratio can 
significantly explain a firm’s long mn performances, in this article, sample firms’ 3-year 
buy-and-hold returns sorted by size and market-to-book ratio are then examined. 
Consistent with previous studies, market value of equity is obtained by multiplying stock 
price (Item 24 in Compustat) and common shares outstanding (Item 25). Book value of 
equity is calculated as the common total equity (Item 60) plus deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit (Item 35). IPO firms are divided into four size groups according to 
market value at the end of 24 months. The biggest quintile include firms with size over 
1000 million, and the smallest quintile include firms with size less than 100 million. 
Firms are also divided into five market-to-book ratio quintiles according to their market- 
to-book ratio at the end of 24 month after IPO. All negative market-to-book ratio firms
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are categorized in the “Negative” group, and the positive market-to-book ratio firms are 
then divided into four groups with the fourth group having the largest market-to-book 
ratio and the first group having the smallest market-to-book ratio.
Table 19 represents the distribution of sample firms by size quintiles and market- 
to-book ratio quintiles. From Panel A, 40 percent firms are located in the smallest size 
quintile, while only 13.7 percent firms are in the largest size quintile. Concerning market- 
to-book ratio, 16.71 percent firms are smallest in size and smallest in positive market-to- 
book ratio. Only 5.75 percent firms fall into the largest in size and market-to-book ratio 
group. Panel B and Panel C list the corresponding size and market-to book ratio among 
the 20 size and market-to-book ratio categories. Table 20 shows the 36-month buy-and- 
hold return by size, market-to-book ratio, and both size and market to book ratio 
categorizes. In panel A, 36-month return for Internet firms do not exhibit a pattern with 
size, while for Non-Intemet firms, it shows the largest firms have the highest buy-and- 
hold return, which is .5951. When controlling for market to book ratio, the highest 
market to book ratio Internet firms have a slightly higher return, -.4741, but it is still less 
than return for Non-Intemet firms, which is .1756 (Panel B). When controlling for both 
size and market-to-book ratio, it appears that almost all Internet firms have smaller 
returns than Non-Intemet firms in the same size and market to book ratio category. The 
results in table 20 imply that the most powerful variables, size and market to book ratio, 
cannot explain the significant return difference between Internet firms and Non-Intemet 
firms.
[Insert Table 19 and 20 here]
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Since Jain and Kini (1994) find a significant decline in operating performance 
subsequent to the initial public offerings, it is necessary to examine the change of 
operating performance for the sample firms, and to understand how the negative 36- 
month buy-and-hold return can be explained by decline of operating performance. Table 
21 represents the actual operating performance data in the issuing year and 3 years 
following. Internet firms experienced a steady growth is sales, with a total of 273.38 
million in the issuing year, and reaching 468.67 million by the end of the third year after 
IPO. Non-Intemet firms had higher sales than Internet firms in the issuing year and the 
year following, but lower sales in the second and the third year. All firms’ earnings to 
total assets, earnings per share, cash flow per share, and cash flow to total assets ratios 
are negative, and never showed positive in the 3 years period. By the end of third year 
after IPO, the operating performance of Internet and Non-Intemet firms are very close to 
each other. Since the results do not show that there is a clear decline of firm’s operating 
performance, the overreaction hypothesis is preliminarily supported. The very negative 
3-year buy-and-hold return for Internet firms is possibly attributable to market price 
correction instead of decline of operation performance.
[Insert Table 21 here]
5.3 Regression results
OLS regressions were mn for testing the short- term (6 month) momentum and 
long-mn (36-month) price reversals with short term and long term buy-and-hold index 
adjusted return as dependent variables respectively. Table 22 represents 6 regression 
results for testing short-term momentum, in which the dependent variables are 1 month to
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6 month buy-and-hold returns. The independent variables include initial return (which are 
represented by Cold, Hot, and Extra-hot dummy variables), Internet dummy variables, 
Pre-IPO fundamental variables like age, earnings per share, firm size, and control 
variables like underwriter’s ranking. A positive momentum for Internet firms is found in 
the 4th, 5th, and 6th month buy and hold periods as evidenced by the fact that the Internet 
Dummy variables are significantly positive in those regressions. For example, when 6- 
month buy-and-hold return is dependent variable, the coefficient for Internet dummy 
variable is .2388, which means average Internet firms earned 24% higher 6-month buy- 
and-hold returns than Non-Intemet firms when controlling for firm’s risk and initial 
returns. Hot IPOs, which have initial return between 10 percent and 60 percent, also 
exhibit a positive momentum and earned significantly higher short-term returns than 
other firms. Fundamental variables like Age before IPO and earnings per share before 
IPO are irrelevant to firms’ short-term returns, which is consistent with Jaggia and 
Thosar’s finding that fundamental variables have at best weak explanatory power for 
short-term returns. One interesting finding is that underwriter’s ranking is significantly 
related to firms’ after market performance, which may indicate that prestigious 
underwriters support their issues after initial issuing.
[Insert Table 22 here]
According to the overreaction hypothesis, with an increase in public information, 
stock prices would eventually fall and a price reversal pattern would be exhibited. Table 
23 represents four regression results with 3-year buy-and-hold return as the dependent 
variables. The independent variables include pre-IPO fundamental variables, such as 
earning per share, sales to total asset, sales per share, and age before IPO; initial return
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
variables which include 3 dummy variables; control variables, such as underwriter’s 
ranking, firm size and market to book ratio at the end of second year after IPO; Internet 
dummy variable; and the change of operating performance variables, such as a serials of 
change of earnings per share variables. The i**1 year change of earning per share is
i L
calculated as the difference of earning per share between i year and one year before, 
then dividing by earnings per share the year before. The results in Table 23 are consistent 
with the overreaction hypothesis in two respects: firstly, all the Internet dummy variables 
are significantly negative, with coefficients bigger than 30%. In other words, after 36 
month from initial public offerings, Internet firms earned 30% less buy-and-hold returns 
than Non-Intemet firms. Thus price reversal pattern for Internet firms are established. 
Secondly, fundamental variables, like sales per share and sales to total assets, which 
cannot explain initial returns and short- term buy-and-hold returns, can explain firms’ 
long-run buy-and-hold returns with significantly positive coefficients. The higher the 
sales per share or sales to total assets before IPO, the better the long-mn after market 
performances tend to be. In order to test whether change of operating performance can 
predict firms’ long-mn performance, change of earnings per share in the first, second, and 
third year after IPO are included as the independent variables. The results show that an 
increase of earnings per share in the first year and third year contribute significantly to 
firm’s long-mn performance. Unlike market to book ratio, firm size is relevant to explain 
long mn performances. Among the three initial return dummy variables, extra hot IPOs 
have the worst returns since the coefficients are all significantly negative. Underwriter’s 
rankings are not significant any more as they are in the short-term period.
[Insert Table 23 here]
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6. Evidence on underwriter’s self selection for offerings
Ritter (2002) proposes that in the Internet bubble period, prestigious underwriters 
loose their issuing standards and undertook a large amount of very young and small firms. 
Since most Internet firms are every young and small, it is expected that prestigious 
underwriters did not strictly select Internet firms according to their pre-IPO performances, 
but for Non-Intemet firms, the selection criteria are still higher for prestigious 
underwriters than for non-prestigious underwriters. Based on this argument, the proposed 
hypothesis is that pre-IPO operating performances are positively related to underwriter’s 
reputation for non-Intemet firms, but this relation does not hold for Internet firms.
Underwriter’s rankings are from Jay Ritter’s personal database and are divided 
into nine categories, with 9.1 representing the most prestigious underwriters and 1.1 
represent the lease prestigious underwriters. Table 24 shows the descriptive statistics 
among underwriters with different reputations. It is clear that the most prestigious 
underwriters were responsible for 59.87% percent market, while underwriters in the other 
eight categories, which is referred as non-prestigious underwriters, were responsible for 
only 40.13% market. Overall, prestigious underwriters set higher offer prices and made 
larger offer amounts than less prestigious underwriters. Concerning initial returns, firms 
undertaken by prestigious underwriters experienced higher initial returns for both Internet 
and Non-Intemet firms than firms undertaken by non-prestigious underwriters.
[Insert Table 24 here]
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Table 25 shows the results of underwriters’ self-selection according to pre-IPO 
performance between prestigious and un-prestigious underwriters. For the total firms 
(Panel A), prestigious underwriters pick firms having significantly high income to total 
assets, cash flow to total assets, sales per share, sales growth rate, and low debt to total 
assets. These results are consistent with the concept that prestigious underwriters pick up 
better-performing firms than non-prestigious underwriters do. Panel B and Panel C are 
the results for Internet firms and Non-Intemet firms respectively. It is interesting to note 
that there exists a divergence in underwriter’s self-selection tastes for Internet firms and 
Non-Intemet firms. Prestigious underwriters were apparently more concerned with firms 
sales to total assets, debt to total assets, and sales growth rate regarding Internet firms, 
while they consider cash flow to total assets, cash flow per share, sales per share, and 
debt per share for non-Intemet firms. The only commonality between Internet and Non- 
Intemet firms is that prestigious underwriters tend to select large firms. Firms undertaken 
by prestigious underwriters are large in size compared to those undertaken by non- 
prestigious underwriters. Moreover, the mean size for Internet and non-Intemet firms 
undertaken by prestigious underwriters is significantly different, which is 658.22 million 
for Internet firms, andl054.93 million for non-Intemet firms. The overall results from 
Table 25 show that prestigious underwriters appeared to pick up big and better 
performing firms, and the non-Intemet firms they selected have better pre-IPO 
performance than Internet firms they selected. Therefore, the results do not support the 
hypothesis that prestigious underwriters are unconcerned about Internet firms’ 
performance when undertaking them.
[Insert Table 25 here]
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Table 26 represents the Probit regression results with the underwriter’s reputation 
as the dependent variables. If the underwriter is prestigious with a raking 9.1, the 
dependent variable equals 1, otherwise, it equals 0. Three regressions were run with 
different pre-IPO performance variables in each regression. Among the pre-IPO 
operating performance variables, sales per share and cash flow per share are significantly 
positive, with coefficients of 0.0542 and 0.1997 respectively. The logarithmic size is 
significantly positive in every regression, with coefficients exceeding .70. These are 
strong indications that prestigious underwriters tend to choose firms with higher sales per 
share and larger size than non-prestigious underwriters do. When comparing their 
coefficients, size contributes the most prominently to the explanation of dependent 
variables. The Internet dummy variable is not significant, and provides evidence that 
prestigious underwriters do not treat Internet firms differently when making underwriter 
decisions. Overall, prestigious underwriters consider the pre-IPO operating performance 
for both Internet firms and Non-Intemet firms, even though overall Internet firms are 
smaller in size and less profitable compared to Non-Intemet firms.
[Insert Table 26 here]
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7. Conclusion
Internet related firms experienced an extremely high degree of underpricing in the 
year 1999 and 2000; 40 percent more than underpricing of Non-Intemet firms. Two 
explanations for this phenomenon are examined in this paper: the changing risk 
composition hypothesis and overreaction hypothesis. Changing risk composition, which 
is based on asymmetric information theory, states that the degree of price revision and 
underpricing is correlated with firm’s ex ante uncertainty. Variables like years existing 
before IPO, offer size, pre-IPO operating performance, and sales growth rate are chosen 
as the proxies to measure firms’ ex-ante uncertainty. The overreaction hypothesis is 
derived from behavior theory, and states that investors often violate rational choice when 
making decisions. According to DHS theory (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 
1998), initial overreaction and self-attribution bias would drive the price above the 
rational expected value. Further information will gradually induce the price back toward 
fundamental value. Based on the overreaction hypothesis, the extremely high initial 
returns that are unexplained by fundamentals, the medium-term momentum, and the 
long-mn price reversal are expected for Internet firms. Empirical tests are thus conducted 
in these three stages: first trading day, medium-term, and long-mn performances.
The results are consistent with both hypotheses, and the high initial returns for 
Internet firms are explainable by investors’ over-reaction and the firm’s high uncertainty. 
Among all the uncertainty measures, sales growth rate and age of the firm before IPO are 
the most powerful. Pre-IPO performances are not significant predictors of firms’ initial 
returns for Internet firms, while investors value pre-IPO debt per share, sales growth rate,
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and age before IPO for non-Intemet firms. Internet firms exhibit strong medium-term 
positive momentum and long-term price reversal after controlling for the change of 
operating performance, firm size, and market to book ratio. Internet firms earned 23% 
higher returns in the medium-term and 30% lower return in the long run than Non- 
Intemet firms. Long-term performances are significantly explained by pre-IPO 
fundamentals like sales per share.
When concerning underwriter’s self-selection, the results show that prestigious 
underwriters do like to select big and better-performing firms. Sales per share and offer 
size are significant criteria for prestigious underwriters. For prestigious underwriters, 
non-Intemet firms they picked have better pre-IPO performance than Internet firms they 
picked. Overall, the results do not support the hypothesis that prestigious underwriters do 
not care about Internet firms’ performance when undertaking them.
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Figure 1
3-year buy and hold index adjusted returns between Internet and non-Internet
firms
The initial return date is defined as month 0, and the aftermarket period includes the following 36 months. 
Each month is defined as successive 22-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. In other words, month 
1 consists o f event days 1-22, month 2 consists event days 23-44, etc. For IPOs that are delisted before 
their 3 years anniversary, the aftermarket period is truncated on the last trading day. The daily benchmark 
returns are the value-weighted NYSE NASDAK, and AMEX index return (CRSP index return 100080).
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Figure 2
3-year Cumulative index adjusted returns between Internet and non-Internet
firms
The initial return date is defined as month 0, and the aftermarket period includes the following 36 months. 
Each month is defined as successive 22-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. In other words, month 
1 consists o f  event days 1-22, month 2 consists event days 23-44, etc. For IPOs that are delisted before 
their 3 years anniversary, the aftermarket period is truncated on the last trading day. The daily benchmark 
returns are the value-weighted NYSE NASDAK, and AMEX index return (CRSP index return 100080).
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Table 1
The ratio of Internet-related IPOs to total Issues between 1996 to 2002
Data are from edgar-online.com. The total issues do not include those that are not public traded. Ratio 
of Internet related is calculated as number of Internet related to total issues.
Year Total Internet related Ratio o f Internet 
related (%)
1996 313 17 5.43
1997 659 30 4.55
1998 471 43 9.13
1999 609 313 51.40
2000 508 164 32.28
2001 149 4 2.68
2002 134 13 9.7




The IPO firms are identified from edgar-online.com.
Criteria Number o f firms Total left
Total public issues 1117
Country of origin which outside the USA 145 972
Issues from OTCBB, SWX, VANCOUV, MA 88 884
Not be found in CRSP (no Permno number) 13 871
Financial companies (including Unit offering, REIT, close- 81 790
end fund)
Companies whose offer price is not be found 9 781
Companies with offer prices below $5 3 778
Companies with missing shares offering data 5 773
Companies issued with warrant or right 10 763
Companies mislabled as an IPO 1 762
Companies that can not be located in COMPUSTAT 16 746
according to their CUSIP
Companies that only have the first trading return data in 2 744
CRSP
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Table 3 
Descriptive Characters of Issue firms
Table values are mean measures for 744 IPOs in the year 1999 and 2000. 376 firms are Internet related and 
368 are Non-Internet related. Offer data are from edgar-online, and first trading day close price data are 
from CRSP daily return tape. All firm operating performance data are relative year -1 , which is one year 
before firm’s IPO, and they are collected from COMPUSTAT. Float represents the amount o f shares 
offered in the IPO as a percentage o f total shares outstanding. Change in offer range is calculated as the 
ratio o f price difference between mid point o f final offer range and initial offer range to midpoint o f initial 
offer range. Change in offer price is calculated as the ratio o f  price difference between offer price and final 
mid point o f offer range to final mid point o f offer range. The initial return is defined as the percentage 
difference between first day closing price and the offering price. The rankings of underwriter’s reputation 
are from Jay Ritter’s IPO data sources. Offering size is measured as the amount o f shares outstanding 









Issue amount (million $) 128.4765 82.5029 175.4495 _4 ]4*»
Size (Million $) 629.3004 506.0491 755.2310 -2.44*
Share offered 8170089 6224533 10000000 -3.56**
Share outstanding 36715370 32622.75 40896.96 -2.03*
Float rate .2740 .2328 .3160 -5.14**
Midpoint of final offer 
range ($)
13.8945 13.5678 14.2284 -1.67
Change in offer range .0871 .1405 .0325 5.98**
Change in offer price .0478 .0756 .0194 5.65**
Price revision .1509 .2382 .0616 7.09**
Underwriter’s rank 8.2796 8.3213 8.2361 .785
Offer price ($) 14.7243 14.8059 14.6409 .357
First-day close price ($) 27.0741 31.0610 23.0005 4.22**
Initial return .6689 .8858 .4473 6.76**
* Significant at .05 
** Significant at .001
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Table 4 
Mean of issue firms characteristics regarding ex ante uncertainty
Table values are mean measures for 744 IPOs in the year 1999 and 2000. 376 firms are Internet related 
and 368 are Non-Internet related. Offer data are from edgar-online, and first trading day close price 
data are from CRSP daily return tape. All firm operating performance data are relative year -1 , which 
is one year before firm’s IPO, and they are collected from COMPUSTAT.
Panel A
Total Internet-related Non-Intemet related Difference
(n= 744) (n= 376) (n=368) (t-value)
Age (years existing 9.4808 5.4478 13.1437 -6.34**
before IPO)
Size (million $) 629.3004 506.0491 755.2310 -2.44*
Sales (million $) 218.8492 20.8462 421.7079 -3.27**
Earnings (million $) -6.0570 -14.1500 2.2120 -2.62**
Cash Flow (million $) 5.7668 -11.9000 23.7305 -3.48**
Total Asset (million $) 361.8679 42.1208 688.5661 -2.61**
Total Debt (million $) 89.2030 12.2419 168.4835 -4.65**
Panel B
(Number of firms)
Total Internet-related Non-Intemet related
(n= 744) (n= 376) (n=368)
eamings<=0 573 338 (89.89%) 235 (63.86%)
Eamings>0 171 38 (10.11%) 133 (36.14%)
Cash flow<=0 513 315 (83.78%) 198 (53.8%)
Cash flow>0 207 48 (12.77%) 159(43.21%)
** Significant at .01 level
* Significant at .05 level
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Table 5 
Descriptive Characters of Issue firm’s pre-IPO financial performance
Table values are mean pre-IPO operating measures for 744 IPOs in the year 1999 and 2000. 376 firms are 
Internet related and 368 are Non-Intemet related. All firm’s operating performance data are relative to year 
-1 , which is one year before firm’s IPO, and are collected from COMPUSTAT. Sales growth rate are 
measured as [sales(-l)-sales(-2)]/sales(-2).
Total Internet-related Non-Intemet related Difference
(n= 744 ) (n= 376) (n=368) (t-value)
A: Scaled by total asset
Sales/asset 1.1517 1.0305 1.2759 .588
Income/asset -.6739 -.9871 -.3538 -5.161**
Cash flow/asset -.6199 -.8964 -.3386 -4.655**
Debt/asset .3365 .3310 .3421 -.253
B: Scaled by share outstanding
Sales per share 3.4781 .8865 6.1332 -5.503**
Income per share -.3171 -.4628 -.1683 -3.370**
Cash flow per share -.1064 -.3893 .1813 -5.517**
Debt per share 1.8298 .4808 3.2194 -6.211**
C: Growth rate
Sales growth rate 4.2480 5.3911 3.1050 3.41**
** Significant at .01 level
* Significant at .05 level
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Table 6 
Description of issue firm’s price revision
The sample covers 744 IPOs in the years 1999 and 2000. 376 firms are Internet related and 368 are Non- 
Intemet related. Offer data are from Edgar-online, and first trading day closing price data are from CRSP 
daily return tape. Change in offer range is calculated as the ratio o f price difference between mid point of  
final offer range and initial offer range to mid point o f initial offer range. Change in offer price is calculated 
as the ratio o f price difference between offer price and final mid point of offer range to final mid point offer 
range. The initial return is defined as the percentage difference between first day closing price and the 
offering price. The rankings o f underwriter’s reputation are from Jay Ritter’s IPO data sources. Total price 
revision is calculated as the ratio o f price difference between final offer price and mid point o f initial offer 
price range.







































































<0 69 125 -.2257 -.2004 .1150 .0795
3  8 - 2  t  -c ■§ =0 32 58 0 0 .3944 .1394H Cm g(-1 >0 274 184 .3829 .2590 1.1400 .7963
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
Table 7 
Price revision and Pre-IPO performance
The sample covers 744 IPOs offered in the years 1999 and 2000. 376 firms are Internet related and 368 are 
Non-Intemet related. Offer data are from Edgar-online, and first trading day closing price data are from the 
CRSP daily return tape. Issue firms’ price revision is investigated in two stages. The first stage, the change 
o f offer price range between the mid point o f initial price range and final price range is measured. The 
second stage is to investigate the price change between the final offer price and the final midpoint o f price 
offer range. Change in offer range is calculated as the ratio o f the change offer range to the initial mid point 
o f offer range. Change in offer price calculated as the ratio of price difference between offer price and final 
mid point of offer range. Total price revision is calculated as the ratio of price difference between final 





Sales/assets I 1.3038 .8862 .9768
II .8992 3.7372 .7600
Income/assets I -1.0501 -1.4423 -.9218
II -.3821 -.3463 -.3390
Cash flow/assets I -.9282 -1.3781 -.8339
II -.3324 -.5044 -.2942
Debt/assets I .3605 .7018 .2815
II .3940 .3683 .3004
Sales per share I .7674 .2002 .9870
II 6.8481 8.7748 4.8416
Income per share I -.4033 -.4288 -.4838
II -.2049 -.3602 -.0845
Cash flow per share I -.3284 -.3951 -.4062
II .2336 -.0666 .2216
Debt per share I .2763 .1653 .5709
II 4.4371 3.3818 2.3548
Sales growth rate I 3.9068 5.7663 5.7152
II 2.2495 1.6797 4.1956
I-Intemet firms 
II-Non-Intemet firms
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Table 8
Price revision and initial return among positive and negative operating performance 
groups
All firms’ operating performance data are relative to year -1 , which is one year before firm’s IPO, and are 
collected from COMPUSTAT. Total price revision is calculated as the ratio of price difference between 
final offer price and mid point of initial price range to mid point o f initial price range. The initial return is 
defined as the percentage difference between first day closing price and the offering price. The rankings of 









Net income Per .1758 .0447 .8087 .3702
Share >= 0
Net income Per .2451 .0711 .8944 .4909
Share < 0
Cash Flow Per .1921 .0368 .8484 .3324
Share>=0
Cash Flow Per Share .2456 .0855 .8792 .5500
<0













Initial return on pre-IPO operating performance quintile
All firms’ operating performance data are relative year -1 , which is one year before firm’s IPO, and are collected from COMPUSTAT. Operating performance 
measures are categorized to 5 quintiles. The first represents the lowest performance group and the fifth represents the highest performance group. Initial return is 
defined as the percentage difference between first day closing price and the offering price.
Sales/asset Income/asset Cash Debt/asset Sales per share Income per Cash flow per Debt per share Growth
quintile quintile Flow/asset quintile quintile share quintile share quintile quintile quintile
quintile
I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II
1 .970 .541 .815 .535 .773 .549 .947 .495 .894 .573 .909 .382 .954 .493 .984 .484 .637 .271
2 .765 .501 1.026 .663 1.117 .706 1.058 .572 .938 .752 .986 .593 .957 .583 .999 .712 .665 .381
3 1.029 .492 .804 .605 .797 .603 .851 .607 .897 .581 .872 .541 .871 676 .822 .586 .780 .384
4 .709 .473 .928 .236 .804 .243 .872 .397 .888 .501 .855 .483 .780 .469 .842 .554 .925 .563
5 .920 .236 .830 .408 .861 .389 .618 .251 .588 .180 .658 .338 .541 .274 .470 .191 1.087 .955
I = Internet firms














Pre-IPO performance among four initial return groups
The sample covers 744 IPOs offered in the years 1999 and 2000. 376 firms are Internet related and 368 are Non-Intemet related. Firms’ operating performance 
data are relative to year -1 , which is one year before firm’s IPO, and are collected from COMPUSTAT. Initial return is defined as the percentage difference 
between first day closing price and the offering price. Extra-cold IPOs are offers with initial return equal or less than zero; Cold IPOs are offers with initial 
return more than zero but equal or less than 10%; Hot IPOs are offers with initial return great than 10% but less or equal 60%; and extra-hot IPOs are offers with 
initial return more than 60%.
Sales/asset Income/asset Cash Flow/asset Debt/asset Growth rate
Internet Non- Internet Non- Internet Non Internet Non Internet Non
Extra-cold 1.358 .9638 -1.0091 -.2986 -.9664 -.2422 .6142 .4066 3.4891 1.8512
Cold 1.4893 2.9138 -1.2319 -.2448 -1.1913 -.3551 .6734 .3149 6.1374 2.5214
Hot 1.0564 .6254 -.9195 -.3922 -.7398 -.3508 .2566 .3912 4.8422 2.5478
Extra-hot .8333 .6828 -.9806 -.4294 -.9223 -.3820 .2292 .2343 6.2257 5.5920
Continued on Table 10:
Sales per share Earnings per share Cash flow per share Debt per share
Internet Non Internet Non Internet Non Internet Non
Extra-cold .6853 11.9296 -.4788 -.5100 -.4001 .1301 .7236 5.1440
Cold .6376 6.4640 -.4466 -.1696 -.3893 .2777 .3402 4.4955
Hot 1.3711 5.9436 -.5076 .0432 -.3906 .3511 .8959 3.3205














Correlation Matrix between pre-IPO financial performances
All firm operating performance data are relative to year -1 , which is one year before firm’s IPO, and are collected from COMPUSTAT.
Sales/assets Total debt/ assets Sales per share Earnings per share Cash flow per 
share
Debt per share Sales growth rate
Sales/assets 1 .039 .020 .029 .067 -.025 -.046
Total debt/ assets .039 1 .009 -.057 -.023 .167** -.061
Sales per share .020 .009 1 159** .561** .505** -.089*
Earnings per share .029 -.057 .159** 1 .843** -.085* -0.95*
Cash flow per share .067 -.023 .561** .843** 1 .311** -.112**
Debt per share -.025 .167** .505** -.085* .311** 1 -.015
Sales growth rate -.046 -.061 -.089* -.095* -.112** -.049 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 














Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results with price revision as the Dependent Variable
Table values are mean measures for 744 IPOs in the year 1999 and 2000. 376 firms are Internet related and 368 are Non-Intemet related. Offer data are from 
Edgar-online, and first trading day close price data are from the CRSP daily return tape. All firm operating performance data are relative to year -1 , which is one 
year before firm’s IPO, and are collected from COMPUSTAT. Dependent variable price revision is calculated as the ratio o f  price difference between offer price 
and mid point o f  initial price range to mid point o f  initial price range. Float represents the amount o f  shares sold in the IPO as a percentage o f total shares 
outstanding. The rankings o f underwriter’s reputation are from Jay Ritter’s IPO data sources. Offering size is measured as the amount o f  share outstanding 
multiplying the offer price.
Sales asset: sales to total asset before IPO.
Income asset: Income to total asset before IPO.
CF asset: Cash Flow to total asset before IPO.
Debt asset: debt to total asset before IPO.
Sales_ps: Total sales divided by total share outstanding at IPO.
EPS: total net income divided by total share outstanding at IPO.
CF_ps: cash flow divided by total share outstanding at IPO.
Debt_ps: Debt divided by total share outstanding at IPO.
Growth: sales growth rate before IPO.















1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept -.06394 -0.6790 -0.6454 -0.7403 -0.7064 -0.5993









C F P S -0.0191
(-1.70)*




Log (size) 0.1579 0.1629 0.1575 0.1737 0.1717 0.1465
(9.23)** (9.38)** (9.22)** (9.65)** (9.80)** (8.12)**
Age -0.0030 -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0025
(-3.46)** (-2.90)** (-3.30)** (-2.99)** (-2.98)** (-2.84)**
Rank -.0245 -0.0250 -0.0247 -0.0269 -0.0237 -0.0271
(-2.17)** (-2.25)** (-2 .21)** (-2.33)** (-2.13)** (-2.27)**
Float 0.1460 0.1783 0.1341 0.2161 0.2840 0.1309
(2.00)* (2.30)* (1.87)* (2.71)** (3.29)** (1.84)
Internet 0.1758 0.1531 0.1570 0.1552 0.1505 0.1349
(7.39)** (5.71)** (5.84)** (5.72)** (5.61)** (4.68)**
Adjust R-square 0.2094 0.2092 0.2055 0.2189 0.2189 0.2175















Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results with Initial Return as the Dependent Variable
Initial return: (first day close price-offer price)/ offer price. Sales asset: sales to total asset before IPO. Incomeasset: Income to total asset before IPO. CF asset: 
Cash Flow to total asset before IPO. Debt asset: debt to total asset before IPO. Sales_ps: Total sales divided by total share outstanding at IPO. EPS: total net 
income divided by total share outstanding at IPO. CF ps: cash flow divided by total share outstanding at IPO.______________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept -1.0457 -1.1750 -1.0878 -1.1076 -1.3417 -0.9513















Log(size) 0.2404 0.2545 0.2404 0.2497 0.2719 0.2057
(5.22)** (5.44)** (5.23)** (5.20)** (5.77)** (4.14)**
Age -0.0059 -0.0051 -0.0061 -0.0055 -0.0050 -0.0037
(-2.50)** (-2.09)** (-2.54)** (-2.24)** (-2.14)** (-1.53)
Rank 0.0392 0.0395 0.0414 0.0337 0.0430 0.0292
(1.28) (1.31) (1.37) (1.08) (1.42) (0.88)
Float -0.2715 -0.1833 -0.2949 -0.1967 0.0288 -0.2651
(-1.37) (-0.87) (-1.52) (-0.92) (0.12) (-1.34)
Internet 0.3642 0.3600 0.3678 0.3526 0.3528 0.2861
(4.97)** (4.93)** (5.04)** (4.82)** (4.84)** (3.56)**















Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results with Initial Return as the Dependent Variable For Internet Firms
Initial return: (first day close price-offer price)/ offer price. Sales_asset: sales to total asset before IPO. Income asset: Income to total asset before IPO. CF_asset: Cash Flow to 
total asset before IPO. Debt_asset: debt to total asset before IPO. Sales_ps: Total sales divided by total share outstanding at IPO. EPS: total net income divided by total share 
outstanding at IPO. CF_ps: cash flow divided by total share outstanding at IPO. Debt_ps: Debt divided by total share outstanding at IPO. Growth: sales growth rate before IPO. 
Age: years existing before IPO.__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intercept -2.5303 -2.4263 -2.4099 -2.2288 -2.5603 -2.4391 0.4636









C F P S -0.1547
(-1.08)




Log(size) 0.4710 0.4632 0.4642 0.4263 0.4805 0.4431
(5.19)** (5.10)** (5.07)** (4.65)** (5.28)** (4.05)**
Age -0.0096 -0.0064 -0.075 -0.0063 -0.0057 -.0049
(-0.81) (-0.52) (-0.63) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.37)
Rank 0.0830 0.0760 0.0738 0.0725 0.0761 0.0758
(1.55) (1.47) (1-43) (1.34) (1.48) (1.30)
Float 0.1378 0.1855 -0.1556 0.1068 0.3661 0.1351
(0.31) (0.42) (0.34) (0.25) (0.81) (0.30)
Revision 1.7807
(16.56)**















Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results with Initial Return as the Dependent VariableFor Non-Internet Arms
Initial return: (first day close price-offer price)/ offer price. Sales asset: sales to total asset before IPO. Income asset: Income to total asset before IPO. CF asset: 
Cash Flow to total asset before IPO. Debt asset: debt to total asset before IPO. Sales_ps: Total sales divided by total share outstanding at IPO. EPS: total net
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Intercept -0.1472 -0.3900 -0.2985 -0.3525 -0.5269 -0.1892 0.3564









C F P S -0.0052
(-0.19)




Log(size) 0.1343 0.1624 0.1455 0.1609 0.1759 0.1463
(2.81)** (3.36)** (3.09)** (3.16)** (3.64)** (3.00)**
Age -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0052 -0.0049 -0.0043 -.0031
(-2.20)** (-2.13)** (-2.56)** (-2.35)** (-2.18)** (-1.55)
Rank 0.0127 0.0096 0.0140 0.0082 0.0123 -0.0121
(0.38) (0.29) (0.42) (0.24) (0.37) (-0.34)
Float -0.3594 0.2562 -0.3693 -0.3333 -0.0645 -0.2604
(-1.89)* (-1.24) (-1.98)** (-1.50) (-0.27) (-1.38)
Revision 1.4922
(14.96)**




Descriptive of 36- month post-IPO returns
Aftermarket period includes the following 36 months after initial trading day. Each month is defined as 
successive 22-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. In other words, month 1 consists o f event days 
1-22, month 2 consists event days 23-44, etc. For IPOs that are delisted before their 3 years anniversary, 
the aftermarket period is truncated on the last trading day, and the buy-and -hold return ends with CRSP’s 
last listing. The daily benchmark returns are the value-weighted NYSE NASDAK, and AMEX index return 
(CRSP index return 100080).
















Month 1 .1027 .0965 .1090 -.380 .1030 .0935 .1127 -.672
Month2 .1072 .1032 .1113 -.176 .0930 .0760 .1102 -.866
Month3 .1874 .2117 .1628 .723 .1334 .1185 .1486 -.621
Month4 .2383 .3262 .1493 2.010* .1361 .1521 .1199 .572
Month 5 .2441 .3541 .1325 2.143* .1296 .1357 .1233 .202
Month6 .1140 .1734 .0541 1.229 .0481 .0128 .0836 -1.090
Month7 .1386 .1854 .0916 .907 .0649 .0281 .1019 -1.069
Month 8 .0827 .1139 .0516 .582 .0372 -.0211 .0955 -1.622
Month9 -.0025 -.0602 .0547 -1.200 .0090 -.0985 .1156 -2.877**
MonthlO -.0521 -.1352 .0308 -1.815 -.0248 -.1565 .1066 -3.436**
Month 11 -.0711 -.1695 .0266 -1.987* -.0478 -.2019 .1051 -3.902**
Month 12 -.0899 -.2067 .0243 -2.178* -.1290 -.3472 .0843 -5.113**
Month 13 -.1063 -.2378 .0208 -2.375* -.1398 -.3705 .0830 -5.241**
Month 14 -.1576 -.3229 .0006 -3.126** -.1202 -.3645 .1137 -5.604**
Month 15 -.1949 -.3867 -.0148 -3.648** -.1213 -.3810 .1227 -5.864**
Monthl6 -.2210 -.4493 -.0112 -4.372** -.1475 -.4452 .1261 -6.462**
Month 17 -.2722 -.5166 -.0501 -5.499** -.1506 -.4729 .1426 -6.902**
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Continue on Table 16
Buy-and-hold returns
Total Internet- Non- difference 
related Internet (t-value) 
related
Cumulative returns
Total Internet- Non- Differen
related Internet ce
related (t-value)
Month 18 -.2815 -.5477 -.0412 -6.058** -.1513 -.5045 .1674 -7.534**
Month 19 -.3110 -.5964 -.0552 -6.914** -.1567 -.5245 .1729 -7.638**
Month 20 -.3288 -.6035 -.0890 -8.638** -.1288 -.4860 .1832 -7.381**
Month21 -.3360 -.6058 -.1042 -8.976** -.1169 -.4343 .1559 -6.417**
Month22 -.3207 -.5856 -.0974 -8.638** -.0933 -.3929 .1591 -5.775**
Month23 -.3205 -.5927 -.0905 -8.301** -.0975 -.3980 .1564 -5.744**
Month24 -.3349 -.5976 -.1082 -8.357** -.0603 -.3581 .1909 -5.778**
Month 25 -.3325 -.5977 -.1119 -8.171** -.0866 -.3747 .1476 -5.405**
Month26 -.3445 -.5990 -.1328 -8.354** -.0481 -.3105 .1652 -4.824**
Month27 -.3398 -.5914 -.1343 -8.104** -.0319 -.2932 .1766 -4.714**
Month28 -.3274 -.5780 -.1240 -7.752** .0353 -.2101 .2297 -4.335**
Month29 -.3175 -.5625 -.1217 -7.194** .0677 -.1722 .2548 -4.155**
Month 30 -.3193 -.5770 -.1151 -7.716** .0678 -.2017 .2762 -4.517**
Month31 -.3188 -.5710 -.1232 -7.579** .0939 -.1339 .2664 -3.788**
Month32 -.3028 -.5713 -.0947 -7.279** .1695 -.0860 .3627 -4.239**
Month33 -.2942 -.5811 -.0696 -7.226** .1913 -.0713 .3918 -4.285**
Month34 -.2684 -.5609 -.0378 -7.053** .2620 -.0237 .4817 -4.664**
Month 35 -.2612 -.5512 -.0348 -7.053** .3238 .0409 .5431 -4.579**
Month36 -.2466 -.5368 -.0156 -7.128** .3999 .1599 .5910 -3.797**
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Table 17
Post-IPO Buy-and-hold returns Categorized by Pre-IPO Performance groups
The sample covers 744 IPOs in the year 1999 and 2000. 376 firms are Internet related and 368 are Non- 
Intemet related Aftermarket period includes the following 36 months. Each month is defined as successive 
22-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. Pre-IPO performances are relative to the year -1 , which is 





3-year buy-and-hold returns 
Internet Non-Intemet
Panel A: P= Sales/Total Assets
0 -0 .1 5 73 68 -.5432 -.3380
0.15-0 .55 66 73 -.5850 .0054
0.55 -1.34 58 86 -.5026 -.0576
1.34-150 67 78 -.5051 .2580
Panel B: P= Net income /Total Assets
-25 ~ -.76 82 47 -.5940 -.3101
-.76 ~ -.36 80 59 -.5720 -.2879
-.36 ~ -.01 63 75 -.4544 -.2573
-.01-  10 39 125 -.4785 .3095
Panel C: P= Cash Flow /Total Assets
-25 -  -.71 81 47 -.5759 -.3768
-.71--.32 77 59 -.5804 -.2229
-.32 -  .02 60 70 -.4374 -.2958
.0 2 -1 .1 4 36 122 -.4624 .3538
Panel D: P= debt /Total Assets
0-.02 73 67 -.4884 -.0890
.0 2 - .1 4 83 59 -.5490 .0794
.1 4 - .4 2 62 88 -.5700 .0145
.42 -  .6.96 46 90 -.5662 -.0703
Panel E: P= Sales per share
0 - .1 81 64 -.5578 -.3826
.1 -  .46 81 49 -.5499 -.2706
.4 6 -1 .7 1 71 70 -.5791 -.1646
1 .73-226 .58 31 122 -.3427 .3226
Panel F: P= earnings per share
-13.42 -  -.56 70 67 -.5554 -.2569
-.55 -  -.28 71 61 -.5397 -.1896
-.28 -  -.02 79 58 -.5473 -.3403
-.02 -15 .91 44 120 -.4924 .3181
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89





3-year buy-and-hold returns 
Internet Non-Intemet
Panel G: Cash flow per share
Internet Non-Intemet Internet Non-Intemet
-.47 ~ -.22 74 55 -.5240 -.2011
-.22 ~ .05 76 58 -.5681 -.3970
.05 ~ 26.08 33 124 -.3520 .3905
Panel H: P= Debt per share
0 -.0 1 78 65 -.4918 -.0661
.01 ~ .1 84 55 -.6083 -.3851
.1 ~ .49 76 69 -.4984 .0327
.49 ~ 83.34 26 115 -.5640 .1304
Panel I: P= Sales growth rate
-.9 -1 .34 30 102 -.3824 .0972
1 .3 4 -1 .9 56 75 -.5195 .0453
1 .9 -3 .6 5 63 51 -.5249 -.3302
3 .66-446 .5 79 37 -.5985 -.0353














After-IPO Buy-and-hold returns Categorized by initial Returns
Aftermarket period includes the following 36 months after initial public offerings. Each month is defined as successive 22-trading-day periods relative to the 
IPO date. For IPOs that are delisted before the 3 year anniversary, the aftermarket period is truncated on the last trading day, and the buy-and -hold return ends 
with CRSP’s last listing. Initial return is defined as the percentage difference between first day closing price and the offering price. Extra-cold IPOs are offers 
with initial return equal or less than zero; Cold IPOs are offers with initial return more than zero but equal or less than 10%; Hot IPOs are offers with initial 






Extra-cold -.2121 .0991 .1465 -.0461 -.3792 .1583
Cold -.0415. -.1842 .0186 -.1608 -.4616 -.0773
Hot -.0308 .3142 .1569 -.0994 -.5074 .0905














Distribution of IPO Arms according to their size and Market-to-Book ratio at the end of the second year
Market value o f  equity is obtained by multiplying stock price (Item 24 in Compustat) and common shares outstanding (Item 25). Book value o f  equity is 
calculated as the common total equity (Item 60) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Item 35). IPO firms are divided into 4 size groups according to 
their market value at the end o f 24 month. The biggest quintile contains firms with size over 1000 million, and the smallest quintile with size less than 100 
million. All negative market-to-book ratio firms are categorized as “Negative” group, and the positive market-to-book ratio firms are then divided into 4 groups 
with the forth group having the largest market-to-book ratio.
Panel A: Distribution o f IPOs (%)
Market-to-book Quintile
Size Quintile Negative 1 2 3 4 Total
smallest 2.74 16.71 12.6 4.11 3.84 40
2 0.82 3.56 7.67 12.33 9.59 33.97
3 0.27 1.64 1.92 3.29 5.21 12.33
Biggest N/A 0.55 2.47 4.93 5.75 13.7
Total 3.83 22.46 24.66 24.66 24.39 100%
Panel B: Size by Portfolio (million)
Market-to-book Quintile
Size Quintile Negative 1 2 3 4
smallest 12.3412 27.9506 53.3127 51.0281 53.3499
2 261.4304 193.1067 221.3970 250.4731 290.6026
3 608.7758 736.3256 675.6808 714.7270 756.9842
Biggest N/A 3167.0945 2605.7844 2871.7230 5535.5331
Panel C: Market to book ratio by Portfolio
Market-to-book Quintile
Size Quintile Negative 1 2 3 4
smallest -1.6004 .5407 1.2163 2.3633 31.6897
2 -9.4576 .6944 1.2794 2.4372 6.7149
3 -11.5465 .5854 1.3296 2.5908 8.7550














36 month buy and hold return categorized by size and market to book ratio portfolios
Each month is defined as successive 22-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. For IPOs that are delisted before the 3 year anniversary, the aftermarket 
period is truncated on the last trading day, and the buy-and -hold return ends with CRSP’s last listing. IPO firms are divided into 4 size groups according to their 
market value at the end of 24 month. The biggest quintile contains firms with size over 1000 million, and the smallest quintile with size less than 100 million.
All negative market-to-book ratio firms are categorized as “Negative” group, and the positive market-to-book ratio firms are then divided into 4 groups with the 
forth group having the largest market-to-book ratio.
Panel A: 36-Month buy-and-hold index adjusted return by size portfolios
Size 1 smallest 2 3 4
Internet -.5577 -.5369 -.5252 -.5416
Non-Internet -.0901 -.2111 -.0491 .5951
Panel B: 36-month buy-and-hold index adjusted return by Market-to-book ratio portfolios
Market-to-book negative 1 2 3 4 biggest
Internet -.6492 -.5571 -.5740 -.5555 -.4741
Non-Internet -.2682 -.2815 .1364 -.0991 .1756
Pane C: 36-month buy-and-hold index adjusted return by size and market-to-book portfolios
Market-to-book Size 1 smallest 2 3 4 biggest
Negative Internet -.6540 -.6253 N/A N/A
Non-Internet -.2553 -.0591 -.7510 N/A
1 Internet -.5705 -.4975 -.5993 N/A
Non-Intemet -.3081 -.4379 -.2423 .6068
2 Internet -.5913 -.5478 -.5440 -.5962
Non-Intemet .4648 -.4426 -.2410 .4827
3 Internet -.2267 -.6267 -.6812 -.5949
Non-Intemet -.2667 -.2096 .2882 .0482
4 Internet -.6233 -.3933 -.4586 -.4828














Change of operating performances in the 3-year period after initial public offerings
Table values are mean and percentage changes o f  operating performance in the issue year and 3 years followed. All firm’s operating performance data are 
collected from COMPUSTAT.
Issuing year 1 2 3
Sales growth Internet firms 273.38 342.84 392.45 468.67
Changes 25.41% 14.47% 19.42%
non-Internet firms 314.05 448.82 387.40 438.54
Changes 42.91% -13.68% 13.20%
Earnings to assets Internet firms -.3811 -.5365 -.8027 -.4274
Changes -40.78% -49.62% 46.75%
non-Internet firms -.2775 -.3383 -.4381 -.3308
Changes -21.91% -29.5% 24.495
Earnings per share Internet firms -30.14 -24.36 -13.92 -2.14
Changes 19.18% 42.86% 84.63%
non-Internet firms -2.45 -2.68 -1.74 -1.99
Changes -9.39% 35.07% -14.37%
Cash Flow to total assets Internet firms -.3214 -.4333 -.6494 -.3229
Changes -34.82% -49.87% 50.28%
non-Internet firms -.2351 -.2704 -.3488 -.2490
Changes -15.01% -28.99% 28.61%
Cash flow per share Internet firms -28.75 -21.48 -10.83 -1.44
Changes 25.29% 49.58% 86.70%
non-Intemet firms -1.90 -1.88 -1.06 -1.29
Changes 1.05% 43.62% -21.7%
Debt to total assets Internet firms 12.15 11.30 13.17 15.04
Changes 7% 16.55% 14.20%
non-Intemet firms 15.78 12.92 13.81 15.35















Regression results for medium-term momentum with 1-6 month buy and hold index adjusted returns as dependent variable
Each month is defined as successive 22-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. For IPOs that are delisted before the 3 year anniversary, the aftermarket 
period is truncated on the last trading day, and the buy-and -hold return ends with CRSP’s last listing. Initial return is defined as the percentage difference 
between first day closing price and the offering price. Extra-cold IPOs are offers with initial return equal or less than zero; Cold IPOs are offers with initial 
return more than zero but equal or less than 10%; Hot IPOs are offers with initial return great than 10% but less or equal 60%; and extra-hot IPOs are offers with 
initial return more than 60%. Age is the existing years before IPO. Offer size is measured as the offer price times shares outstanding at the initial reading day. 
EPS is earning s per share one year before the IPO year and is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Underwriter’s ranking i f  from Jay Ritter’s personal web.
Constant Cold Dummy Hot Dummy Ex-hot Dummy Internet Dummy Age________ Log( offer size) EPS________ Rank________Adjust R2
1-month 0.0079 0.0578 0.1886 0.1303 -0.0032 -0.0013 -0.0704 0.0146 0.0519 0.0344
(0.06) (0.83) (3.50)** (2.42)* (-0.08) (-0.99) (-3.10)** (0.80) (3.27)**
2-months -0.1632 0.0783 0.2485 0.1034 0.0102 -0.0017 -0.0897 0.0153 0.0847 0.0415
(-0.96) (0.86) (3.50)** (1.46) (0 .20) (-1.04) (-3.00)** (0.63) (4.06)**
3-months -0.2398 0.086 0.2307 0.0763 0.0838 -0.0036 -0.0907 0.0263 0.1037 0.0219
(-0.96) (0.64) (2.20)* (0.73) (1.10) (-1.45) (-2.05) (0.73) (3.36)**
4-months -0.1316 0.0579 0.2813 0.0754 0.2676 -0.0043 -0.1094 0.0445 0.0994 0.0229
(-0.40) (0.32) (2.01)* (0.54) (2.65)** (-1.32) (-1.86)* (0.93) (2.42)*
5-months -0.1367 0.0094 0.3315 0.0251 0.3446 -0.0038 -0.1561 0.0533 0.1308 0.0260
(-0.34) (0.04) (1.95)* (0.15) (2.82)** (-0.97) (-2.19)* (0.93) (2.63)**
6-months -0.0927 -0.0154 0.2816 -0.0192 0.2388 -0.0018 -0.1101 0.0227 0.0831 0.0128
(-0.09) (-0.08) (1.83) (-0.12) (2.16)* (-0.51) (-1.71) (0.44) (1.85)
















OLS Regression Results with 3- Year Buy-and-hold returns as Dependant Variable
Aftermarket period includes the following 36 months after initial public offerings. Each month is defined as successive 22-trading-day periods relative to the 
IPO date. Extra-cold IPOs are offers with initial return equal or less than zero; Cold IPOs are offers with initial return more than zero but equal or less than 
10%; Hot IPOs are offers with initial return great than 10% but less or equal 60%; and extra-hot IPOs are offers with initial return more than 60%. Age is the 
existing years before IPO. EPS is earning s per share one year before the IPO year and is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Underwriter’s ranking is obtained from 
Jay Ritter’s personal data source. Market value o f equity is obtained by multiplying stock price and common shares outstanding. Book value o f equity is 
calculated as the common total equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit.
1 2 3 4
c -0.1464 (-0.51) -0.4884 (-1.59) -0.1907 (-0.66) -0.2356 (-0.79)
Cash Flow per share 0.0229 (0.92)
EPS -0.0023 (-0.07)
Sales to total assets 0.1142 (2.61)***
Sales per share 0.0059 (2.36)**
LOG(market value) 0.0494 (1.96)** 0.0580 (2.30)** 0.0517 (2.04)** 0.0467 (1.80)*
LOG(market to book ratio) 0.0557 (1.32) 0.0502 (1.19) 0.0516 (1.21) 0.0555 (1.27)
Rank -0.0200 (-0.67) 0.0071 (0.23) -0.0146 (-0.49) -0.0038 (-0.12)
Age 0.0029 (0.84) 0.0049 (1.54) 0.0068 (2.01)** 0.0051 (1.44)
Cold dummy -0.1897 (-1-24) -0.2103 (-1.37) -0.2039 (-1.33) -0.2055 (-1.28)
Hot dummy -0.1008 (-0.87) -0.1128 (-0.98) -0.1164 (-0.99) -0.1300 (-1.10)
Ex-hot dummy -0.3298 (-2.81)*** -0.3480 (-2.99)*** -0.3536 (-2.98)*** -0.3618 (-3.01)***
Internet dummy -0.3251 (-3.92)*** -0.3393 (-4 11)*** -0.3377 (-4.05)*** -0.3293 (-3.86)***
Change o f  EPS-first year 0.0110 (2.25)** 0.0124 (2.54)*** 0.0107 (2.17)** 0.0113 (2.27)**
Change o f  EPS-second year 0.0055 (0.83) 0.0073 (1.09) 0.0062 (0.92) 0.0061 (0.90)
Change o f EPS-third year 0.0128 (1.84)* 0.0135 (1.95)** 0.0123 (1.76)* 0.0120 (1.71)*
R-Square 0.1971 0.2005 0.1805 0.1769
*** Significant at 1% level; 
** Significant at 5% level; 














Descriptive characters among underwriter’s ranking group
The rankings o f underwriter’s reputation are from Jay Ritter’s IPO data sources. Ranking with 9.1 represents the most prestigious underwriters while 1.1 
represents the underwriters with the least reputation. Initial return is defined as the percentage difference between first day closing price and the offering price. 
Offering size is measured as the amount o f shares outstanding multiplied by the offer price.
Underwriter's ranking 9.1 8.1 7.1 6.1 5.1 4.1 3.1 2.1 1.1
Internet Percentage o f  firms undertaken 30.07% 14.15% 1.9% 1.5% 1.36% 0.95% 0.68% 0.27% 0.14%
Offer price 15.93 13.86 12.82 11.5 12.8 10.07 8.4 8 8
Offer amount 99.87 66.02 50.08 48.71 44.5 26.1 16.24 5.67 8
Initial return 1.0987 0.6926 0.4162 0.251 0.3603 0.7041 0.1329 0.0619 0.1719
Non-Intemet Percentage o f firms undertaken 29.8% 11.02% 2.31% 2.18% 0.95% 0.68% 1.5% 0.41% 0.14%
Offer price 16.42 13.62 12.79 10.24 10 10 8.14 26.6 7
Offer amount 236.37 73.67 51.89 47.64 28.51 28.12 10.68 7.83 14
Initial return 0.5173 0.4562 0.3337 0.4482 0.1111 0.1456 0.0238 0.0889 0.0625
















Pre-IPO Financial performances among prestigious and un-prestigious underwriters
Prestigious underwrites have a ranking 9.1 and unprestigious underwriters have a ranking 8.1 or below. All financial performances data are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT and related to year -1, which is one year before IPO. Offer size is measured as the amount o f  shares outstanding multiplied by the offer price
Panel A: Total Firms




share debt per share growth
prestigious 855.67 0.7484 -0.5564 -0.5041 0.2982 4.1689 -0.3326 -0.0469 2.5436 5.0598
unprestigious 267.02 1.7496 -0.8699 -0.8163 0.398 1.6593 -0.2787 -0.2078 0.5863 3.1492
difference( t- 
value) 7.09** -1.92 2.27* 2.37* -1.99* 3.29** -0.752 1.831 5.2** 3.18**
Panel B: Internet firms




share debt per share growth
prestigious 658.22 0.7235 -0.8096 -0.7545 0.2354 0.9971 -0.5024 -0.4157 0.6275 6.6615




-3.12** 1.86 1.52 -2.81** 0.72 -1.22 -0.91 1.47 3.18**
Panel C: Non-Intemet-firms




share debt per share growth
prestigious 1054.93 0.7736 -0.3008 -0.2536 0.3615 7.3843 -0.1613 0.322 4.4772 3.5419




- 1.21 1.23 2.31* 0.90 3 i9»* -0.18 2.28* 5.09** 1.36
** Significant at 1% level; 













Probit regression results for prestigious and un-prestigious underwriters
If the underwriter is prestigious with a raking 9.1, the dependent variable equals to 1, otherwise, it equals to 0. Sales growth rate, debt to total assets, sales per 
share, and EPS are pre-IPO financial data. Age is the existing years before IPO. Offer size is measured as the offer price times shares outstanding at the initial 
trading day.
1 2 3
c -4.5285 (-8.32)*** -4.0161 (-8.36)*** -4.1011 (-8.16)***
LOG(sales growth rate) 0.1084 (1.39) 0.0845 ( 1.11) 0.0977 (1.27)
Debt to total assets -0.1194 (-0.87)
Sales per share 0.0542 (3.55)***
EPS -0.0429 (-0.59)
Cash Flow Per Share 0.1997 (2.19)**
AGE -0.0025 (-0.48) 0.0036 (0.76) 0.0007 (0.13)
LOG(offer size) 0.8206 (8.93)*** 0.7459 (8.91)*** 0.7649 (8.73)***
Internet dummy -0.0400 (-0.30) -0.1435 (-1.11) -0.0683 (-0.52)
*** Significant at 1% level; 
** Significant at 5% level; 
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